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REFORMING THE LAW ON POLICE USE 
OF DEADLY FORCE: DE-ESCALATION, 
PRESEIZURE CONDUCT, AND IMPERFECT 
SELF-DEFENSE
Cynthia Lee* 
This Article seeks to contribute to the national conversation on re-
forming police practices by evaluating the current law on police use of 
deadly force, identifying problems with that law, and suggesting a modest 
change to that law in the form of model legislation governing police use of 
deadly force. Existing statutes on police use of deadly force tend to focus 
on the reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the need to use force. This 
Article suggests that the law should be reformed to explicitly include a fo-
cus on the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. Under the proposed 
model statute, to be considered a justifiable shooting, the jury must find 
that both the officer’s beliefs and actions were reasonable. To provide bet-
ter guidance to juries than that provided by current use-of-force statutes, 
the model statute specifies three factors that the fact finder must consider 
when deciding whether the officer’s actions were reasonable: (1) whether 
the victim/suspect had or appeared to have a weapon (and whether he or 
she refused orders to drop it), (2) whether the officer engaged in de-esca-
lation measures prior to using deadly force, and (3) whether the officer 
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engaged in any preseizure conduct that increased the risk of a deadly con-
frontation. It also borrows from imperfect self-defense law in civilian hom-
icide cases, permitting the jury to find an officer charged with murder not 
guilty of murder, but guilty of voluntary manslaughter, if the officer’s belief 
in the need to use deadly force was honest but unreasonable or if the of-
ficer’s belief was reasonable, but his actions were unreasonable. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 631 
II. THE LAW ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE ............................... 640
A.  U.S. Supreme Court Cases on the Meaning of Excessive 
Force ..................................................................................... 641 
B.  State Laws on Police Use of Deadly Force ........................... 654 
1. Proportionality ............................................................... 656
2. Necessity ........................................................................ 658
III. MODEL LEGISLATION .................................................................... 661
A.  Model Legislation on Police Use of Deadly Force ............... 664 
1. Tracking Civilian Self-Defense Law .............................. 666
2. De-escalation Measures ................................................. 669
3. Preseizure Conduct ........................................................ 671
4. Imperfect Self-Defense ................................................... 674
B.  Applying the Model Legislation ............................................ 675 
1. Tamir Rice ...................................................................... 675
2. Kimberly A. Crawford’s Report ..................................... 677
a. Threat Identification and Action v. Reaction ....... 677
b. Age ....................................................................... 678
c. Toy Gun ................................................................ 678
C.  Possible Objections ............................................................... 681 
1. The Model Legislation Encourages Jurors to
Second-Guess Police Officers with the
Advantage of Hindsight .................................................. 682 
2. States Should Be Free to Adopt Their Own Rules .......... 682
3. As a Model Statute, the Proposed Reform Has No
Teeth. .............................................................................. 682 
4. The Model Legislation Is Too Complicated for the
 Average Juror to Understand. ...................................... 683 
5. Police Officers Need Bright-Line Rules. ........................ 683
6. Preseizure Conduct Should Not Be Considered. ............ 684
7. The Model Statute Goes Beyond What Is Required
of Ordinary Civilians Claiming Self-Defense. ............... 686 
8. Why Not a Civil Remedy? .............................................. 687
9. The Proposed Reform Would Provoke Civil Unrest ...... 688
LEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018  10:35 AM 
No. 2] REFORMING THE LAW ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 631 
10. Officer Lives Will Be Endangered if Officers
Hesitate to Act out of Fear of Prosecution. .................... 689 
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 690
I. INTRODUCTION 
It seems that we have reached a point of crisis in policing.1 Every month, 
sometimes every week, we hear about yet another police shooting involving a 
victim who, often, is Black.2 With all the protests over the killing of Blacks at 
the hands of police, starting with the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown by Officer 
Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri, the nation’s attention has been focused on 
1. Edward P. Stringham, Is America Facing a Police Crisis?, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2016, 5:34 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-america-facing-a-police-crisis-1469828089 (noting that surveys “show citizen 
confidence in the police at its lowest point in 20 years”). After the shooting of Michael Brown, a USA Today 
Pew Research Center poll “found Americans by 2 to 1 say police departments don’t do a good job in holding 
officers accountable for misconduct, treating racial groups equally, and using the right amount of force.” Susan 
Page, Poll: Whites and Blacks Question Police Accountability, USA TODAY (Aug. 25, 2014, 3:35 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/25/usa-today-pew-poll-police-tactics-military-equip-
ment/14561633/.  
2. I purposely capitalize the “B” in “Black” and the “W” in “White” to call attention to the fact that Black
and White are thought of as racial categories.  
LEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018  10:35 AM 
632 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
reforming policing practices.3 Yet, officer-involved shootings keep happening.4 
In the vast majority of these cases, the person shot by the police had a weapon 
                                                                                                                                      
 3. For example, President Obama created the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing “to 
strengthen community policing and trust among law enforcement officers and the communities they serve—
especially in light of recent events around the country that have underscored the need for and importance of 
lasting collaborative relationships between local police and the public.” FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING iii (May 2015), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p311-
pub.pdf. A plethora of law review articles seeking to reform policing have been published in the last three-to-
four years. See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Toward a Uniform Code of Police Justice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 13 (2016) 
(proposing that states enact a Uniform Code of Police Justice modeled after the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, permitting police officers to be held criminally liable for violations of certain departmental regulations); 
Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 1419, 1419 (2016); Kami Chavis Simmons, The Legacy of Stop and Frisk: Addressing the Vestiges of a 
Violent Police Culture, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 852 (2014); see also Richard Delgado, Critical Perspec-
tives on Police, Policing, and Mass Incarceration, 104 GEO. L.J. 1531, 1543 (2016) (echoing proposals calling 
for police to adopt a “guardian” rather than a “warrior” mentality); Mary D. Fan, Violence and Police Diversity: 
A Call for Research, 2015 BYU L. REV. 875, 875 (2015) (suggesting that further research needs to be done on 
whether diversifying police departments actually makes a difference); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, 
Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1827 (2015); Roger Goldman, Importance of State Law in Police 
Reform, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363, 363 (2016); Linda Sheryl Greene, Ferguson and Beyond: Before and After 
Michael Brown—Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 48 (2015) 
(pushing for greater transparency and accountability by police departments); John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and 
Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 21 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 155, 156 (2016); 
John P. Gross, Unguided Missiles: Why the Supreme Court Should Prohibit Police Officers from Shooting at 
Moving Vehicles, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 135, 135 (2016); Bill Ong Hing, From Ferguson to Palestine: 
Disrupting Race-Based Policing, 59 HOW. L.J. 559, 565 (2016) (reviewing proposals for police reform and ad-
vocating disruption both in the streets and in the sense of reframing how police work gets done); Walter Katz, 
Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent Investigations of Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 235 (2015); Nancy C. Marcus, Out of Breath and Down to the Wire: A Call for Constitution-Focused Police 
Reform, 59 HOW. L.J. 5 (2015); Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights 
Act as a Blueprint for Police Reform, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 264 (2017) (suggesting that Congress enact a 
federal law modeled after the core provisions of the Voting Rights Act to reform police departments engaged in 
civil rights violations); Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L.J. 221, 226 
(2015); J. Michael McGuinness, Law Enforcement Use of Force: Safe and Effective Policing Requires Retention 
of the Reasonable Belief Standard, 39 CHAMPION 26, 33 (2015); Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective 
Civilian Review Boards to Oversee Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1035–39 (2016); Melvin L. Otey, 
Toward Improving Policing in African American Communities, 29 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 67, 67 (2016); Sunita 
Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent 
Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 799–800 (2016); John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law 
Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205 (2015); Richard Rosenfeld, Ferguson and Police Use of Deadly Force, 80 
MO. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2015); Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117 
(2016); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189 (2014); Kindaka 
Sanders, A Reason to Resist: The Use of Deadly Force in Aiding Victims of Unlawful Police Aggression, 52 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 695, 696 (2015); Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 
437 (2016); Nirej Sekhon, Blue on Black: An Empirical Assessment of Police Shootings, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
189, 192–93 (2017); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 391 (2015) (arguing that civil-
ians should actively record police-citizen encounters as a means of making police more accountable to the com-
munity); Jonathan M. Smith, Closing the Gap Between What Is Lawful and What Is Right in Police Use of Force 
Jurisprudence by Making Police Departments More Democratic Institutions, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 315, 336 
(2016); Robin G. Steinberg, Police Power and the Scaring of America: A Personal Journey, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 131, 150 (2015); Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2183–
84 (2014); Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 898 (2014); Seth W. Stoughton, Principles 
Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611, 612–14 (2016) (arguing that 
police officers should embrace a “guardian” mindset as opposed to a “warrior” mindset); Anna Swanson, Revis-
iting Garner with Garner: A Look at Deadly Force and the Use of Chokeholds & Neck Restraints by Law En-
forcement, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 401, 442 (2016); Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with 
the Problems of Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 617; Toussaint Cummings, Note, I Thought He Had a 
Gun: Amending New York’s Justification Statute to Prevent Police Officers from Mistakenly Shooting Unarmed 
Black Men, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 781, 821 (2014) (proposing that when an officer kills an 
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and the shooting would be considered justified under existing law. In several 
recent shootings, however, the person shot did not have a weapon, raising ques-
tions about whether the shooting was in fact justified. 
Until fairly recently, police officers seemed to enjoy an immunity from 
scrutiny for fatalities resulting from officer-involved shootings. Very few offic-
ers were ever prosecuted after shooting and killing a civilian.5 When an officer 
was criminally charged or sued in civil court, judges and juries, more often than 
not, would find in favor of the officer.6 In part, this was because of a tendency 
to believe the officer’s version of events, especially when there was little evi-
dence contradicting that version. The deceased suspect could hardly testify to 
the contrary.7 Additionally, the law encouraged such favoritism.8 
This country has seen an increase in the number of officer-involved homi-
cide prosecutions over the last several years.9 This increase in prosecutions may 
be due to the proliferation of cell phones and the ability of ordinary citizens to 
capture police encounters on video.10 Additionally, more and more police de-
partments are utilizing body-worn cameras and dashboard cameras, which can 
                                                                                                                                      
unarmed Black man not involved in any criminal activity at the time of his death, the officer should have to 
show he was not the initial aggressor and that his conduct was reasonable for his action to be deemed justified); 
Tahir Duckett, Note, Unreasonably Immune: Rethinking Qualified Immunity in Fourth Amendment Excessive 
Force Cases, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 432 (2016); Rukiya Mohamed, Comment, Death by Cop: The Lessons 
of Ferguson Prove the Need for Special Prosecutors, 59 HOW. L.J. 271, 274 (2015); Sarah Zwach, Comment, 
Disproportionate Use of Deadly Force on Unarmed Minority Males: How Gender and Racial Perceptions Can 
Be Remedied, 30 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 185, 188 (2015). 
 4. It is important to acknowledge that only a small percentage of police-civilian encounters involve the 
use of force and that the most frequently used type of force is nondeadly force. POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH 
FORUM, EXPOSING THE CHALLENGES OF POLICE USE OF FORCE 3 (2005). I focus on police use of deadly force 
in this Article, even though it does not reflect what happens in the bulk of encounters between police officers 
and civilians because the consequences in such cases are usually the most severe. 
 5. Roger Goldman, supra note 3, at 377 (noting that between 2005 and 2015, there were only fifty-four 
indictments of police officers despite approximately 1,000 police shootings per year); see also Zusha Elinson & 
Joe Palazzolo, Police Rarely Criminally Charged for On-Duty Shootings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2014, 7:22 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/police-rarely-criminally-charged-for-on-duty-shootings-1416874955?mg= 
prod/accounts-wsj; Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 
11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-prosecuted.  
 6. Kindy & Kelly, supra note 5.  
 7. As one court put it:  
In any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond 
reach. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer’s original 
reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer’s testimony could reasonably 
be rejected at trial. 
Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 8. Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773, 1787–89 
(2016) (explaining reasons courts tend to favor qualified immunity for police officers). 
 9. Goldman, supra note 3, at 366 (noting that, while the number of federal prosecutions of state and local 
police officers has increased since 1960, the total number of such prosecutions is still quite small); Kindy & 
Kelly, supra note 5. Some have criticized what they see as the increasing “politicization of law enforcement.” 
See McGuinness, supra note 3, at 27 (“More police officers are now being indicted because of interest group 
pressure on elected prosecutors.”). 
 10. See Simonson, supra note 3, at 407 (urging more civilians to record police-civilian encounters as a 
way to hold police accountable). In North Charleston, South Carolina, for example, Officer Michael Slager was 
charged with murder after he was caught on video, on April 4, 2015, shooting an unarmed Black man named 
Walter Scott several times in the back while Scott was running away from him and then placing an object near 
Scott’s body. Keith O’Shea & Darran Simon, Closing Arguments End in Slager Trial, No Verdict Reached, CNN 
(Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/30/us/michael-slager-murder-trial-walter-scott. After a five-week 
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provide a record of what happened during an officer-involved shooting.11 This 
increase in prosecutions may also be due, in part, to the fact that over the last 
                                                                                                                                      
trial, however, the case ended in a mistrial because the jury could not come to a unanimous verdict. Darran 
Simon et al., Judge Declares Mistrial in Michael Slager Trial, CNN (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www. 
cnn.com/2016/12/05/us/michael-slager-murder-trial-walter-scott-mistrial. Apparently, eleven jurors wanted to 
find Slater guilty of murder, but at least one juror believed Slager’s claim of self-defense and refused to convict. 
Id. In May 2017, Officer Slager pled guilty to a federal civil rights charge of using excessive force as part of a 
plea bargain to resolve charges against him in both federal and state court stemming from his shooting of Walter 
Scott in April 2015. Holly Yan et al., Ex-Officer Michael Slager Pleads Guilty in Shooting Death of Walter 
Scott, CNN (May 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/02/us/michael-slager-federal-plea/index.html. On De-
cember 7, 2017, a federal judge sentenced Officer Slager to twenty years in prison. Mark Berman, Former S.C. 
Police Officer Who Shot Unarmed Man is Sentenced to 20 Years, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2017, at A2. In another 
widely publicized case involving a video recording, Officer Jeronimo Yanez shot and killed a Black man named 
Philando Castile during a traffic stop on July 6, 2016 in Minneapolis, Minnesota and was charged with second-
degree manslaughter and endangering the lives of Castile’s girlfriend and her four-year-old daughter. Mark Ber-
man, Minnesota Officer Charged with Manslaughter for Shooting Philando Castile During Incident Streamed 
on Facebook, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/11/ 
16/prosecutors-to-announce-update-on-investigation-into-shooting-of-philando-castile/. Although the shooting 
itself was not caught on video, the aftermath of the shooting was captured by Castile’s girlfriend, who streamed 
the video on Facebook Live. Id. Before reaching for his wallet, which contained his driver’s license and permit 
to carry a pistol, Castile had told the officer that he had a firearm with him. Christina Capecchi & Mitch Smith, 
Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Is Charged with Manslaughter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/11/17/us/philando-castile-shooting-minnesota.html. Within seconds of telling Castile not to 
reach for his weapon and Castile assuring the office that he was not doing so, Officer Yanez fired seven rounds, 
fatally wounding Castile. Id. The video sparked national protests. Berman, supra. In June 2017, a jury found 
Officer Yanez, who was charged with second degree manslaughter and endangering safety by discharging a 
firearm, not guilty of all charges. Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html. It 
is important to note that videos of officer-involved shootings may tell only part of the story, especially when the 
moments leading up to the shooting are not recorded. Kimberly Kindy, What the Camera Doesn’t Capture in 
Those Viral Videos of Police Shootings, WASH. POST (July 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/na-
tional/why-those-viral-videos-of-police-shootings-arent-always-as-bad-as-they-look/2016/07/22/63258ddc-
4dbe-11e6-aa14-e0c1087f7583_story.html?. For example, in the Alton Sterling case, in which Baton Rouge po-
lice officers shot and killed an armed Black man on July 5, 2016, the video of the incident does not show de-
escalation measures taken by the officers prior to the shooting, including the deployment of a Taser and telling 
Sterling to get on the ground twice before taking him to the ground. Id. A cell phone video might be taken from 
an angle that shows things the officer could not see, and sometimes a video will be grainy and not clearly show 
what the officers on the scene actually saw. An officer might be seconds away from injury, but appear on video 
to be safe. Id. In May 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice decided not to bring charges against the officers 
involved in the shooting death of Alton Sterling. Matt Zapotosky & Wesley Lowery, Justice Department Will 
Not Charge Baton Rouge Officers in Fatal Shooting of Alton Sterling, WASH. POST (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-will-not-charge-baton-rouge-of-
ficers-in-fatal-shooting-of-alton-sterling/2017/05/02/ac962e66-2ea7-11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html?. At 
the time this Article was being written, the State of Louisiana was still deciding whether to bring charges against 
the officers involved in Alton Sterling’s death. 
 11. See Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras: Exploring the Unintentional Consequences of Technolog-
ical Advances and Ensuring a Role for Community Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985, 987 (2016) 
(discussing the proliferation of body camera technology in police departments). In Chicago, Illinois, on October 
20, 2014, for example, Officer Jason Van Dyke was captured on dash-cam video shooting a Black man named 
LaQuan McDonald from a distance. Annie Sweeney & Jason Meisner, A Moment-by-Moment Account of What 
the Laquan McDonald Video Shows, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 25, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.chicagotrib-
une.com/news/ct-chicago-cop-shooting-video-release-laquan-mcdonald-20151124-story.html. The video, 
which was not released until just over a year after the shooting, shows McDonald walking at some distance from 
Officer Van Dyke with a knife in his hand, hanging by his side. Id.; see also Jason Meisner et al., Chicago 
Releases Dash-Cam Video of Fatal Shooting After Cop Charged with Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2015, 7:14 
PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-cop-shooting-video-laquan-mcdonald-charges-201511 
24-story.html. About the same time that the video was released to the public, Officer Van Dyke was suspended 
without pay or benefits and charged with first-degree murder. Christy Gutowski, Officer in Laquan McDonald 
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three to four years, activists demonstrating under the moniker “Black Lives Mat-
ter” have called the nation’s attention to the deaths of many unarmed Blacks at 
the hands of police and have demanded more police accountability.12 Despite 
the increased number of prosecutions in recent years, it is still the case that law 
enforcement officers are rarely convicted.  
The Black Lives Matter movement started an important national conversa-
tion on policing that continues today. This Article seeks to contribute to this 
national conversation in a small way by evaluating the current law on police use 
of deadly force and suggesting a modest change to that law. In many respects, 
my proposal for reform is less of a radical change in the law regarding when an 
officer’s use of deadly force is justifiable, and more of a clarification of the nor-
mative underpinnings of that law.13 My model statute goes beyond current law 
by broadening the time frame the law considers relevant when assessing the rea-
sonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force so the law can influence police 
behavior before the moment in time when an officer is fearing for his life. It does 
so by explicitly directing jurors to consider any preseizure conduct by the police 
that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. In another departure from cur-
rent law, my model statute explicitly encourages jurors to consider whether the 
officer sought to use de-escalation measures prior to using deadly force and, as 
part of that inquiry, whether less deadly alternatives were feasible prior to the 
use of deadly force. 
This Article will proceed in two main parts. In Part II, I examine the current 
law on police use of deadly force. I highlight problems with both the constitu-
tional standard and state use-of-force statutes. In Part III, I offer one fairly mod-
est proposal for reform, a model statute on police use of deadly force that I hope 
will be adopted by state legislatures. I show how my model statute might make 
a difference, using the Tamir Rice case as an example, then respond to possible 
objections. While much of my previous work has offered race-specific proposals 
for reform,14 the model statute I offer here is race neutral for two reasons. First, 
                                                                                                                                      
Killing ‘Not the Monster’ People Think, Wife Says, CHI. TRIB. (May 13, 2016), http://www.chicagotrib-
une.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ct-jason-van-dyke-wife-laquan-mcdonald-met-20160512-story.html. His crim-
inal case was still pending at the time this Article was written. Christy Gutowski, 2 Years Later, Laquan McDon-
ald Shooting Leaves a Trail of Change, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 20, 2016, 3:49 PM), http://www.chicagotribune. 
com/news/laquanmcdonald/ct-laquan-mcdonald-shooting-anniversary-met-20161020-story.html. Because the 
data from body-worn cameras and dash-cams belong to the police, some have suggested that it is more fruitful 
for citizens to videotape police-citizen encounters. Simonson, supra note 3, at 414.  
 12. For a comprehensive examination of the messages and motivations behind the Black Lives Matter 
movement, see Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
352, 353–54 (2015) (urging law professors to engage with the Black Lives Matter movement by incorporating 
discussion of the movement’s messages in the law school classroom). 
 13. Police-use-of-force law is aimed at both giving police the ability to enforce the law and protecting 
police and civilian lives. Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1119, 
1150–55 (2008). Force used by police must therefore be necessary in order to achieve a law enforcement goal, 
like effectuating an arrest, preventing the escape of a fleeing felon, or protecting the officer or a member of the 
police force from harm. Id. at 1154, 1158–59. To protect against the loss of human life, deadly force, if used, 
should be proportional to the force threatened. 
 14. See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843, 846–
47, 867–69 (2015) (suggesting ways that attorneys can raise awareness of implicit racial bias during voir dire); 
Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. 
L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2013) [hereinafter Lee, Making Race Salient ] (arguing that attorneys concerned about racial 
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the problem I am addressing in this Article transcends race.15 Second, I believe 
legislators are more likely to enact legislation that does not appear to grant spe-
cial treatment to racial minorities. 
It is important to note that no one reform proposal will solve what is essen-
tially a structural problem. This is not a matter of just a few “bad apples” mis-
behaving, as some seem to believe.16 Only a multiplicity of reforms will lead to 
lasting structural changes in policing.17 In a previous article, I focused on reform 
                                                                                                                                      
bias should make race salient by calling attention to racial stereotypes); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self 
Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 488 (1996) [hereinafter 
Lee, Race and Self Defense] (proposing race-switching as a means of getting jurors to perceive their own racial 
biases). 
 15. While much of the nation’s attention has been focused on police shootings of Black men, White males 
are actually killed by police more often than any other group. In 2016, for example, 46% of those who died as a 
result of an officer-involved shooting were White males. Kimbriell Kelly et al., Fatal Shootings by Police Re-
main Relatively Unchanged After Two Years, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/investigations/fatal-shootings-by-police-remain-relatively-unchanged-after-two-years/2016/12/30/fc807 
596-c3ca-11e6-9578-0054287507db_story.html?. When adjusted for their presence in the overall population, 
however, Black males “were three times as likely to die as their White counterparts.” Id. Moreover, when it 
comes to fatal police shootings of unarmed individuals, Black men are disproportionately the victims. For ex-
ample, 34% of the unarmed individuals shot and killed by police in 2016 were Black males. Id. 
 16. U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions reflected this just a few bad apples point of view during his con-
firmation hearing for U.S. Attorney General. Then-Senator Sessions remarked that officers have come to feel 
“unfairly maligned and blamed for the unacceptable actions of a few of their bad actors.” Matt Zapotosky et al., 
Sessions Emphasizes the Primacy of the Law over His Political Views, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-faces-plenty-of-issues-in-confirmation-hearings-
but-is-expected-to-be-approved/2017/01/09/17d85a52-d681-11e6-9f9f-5cdb4b7f8dd7_story.html?; see also 
Ryan J. Reilly, Jeff Sessions Blames Bad Apples for Police Abuse. He Should Read These DOJ Reports, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2017, 10:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-jeff-sessions-civiil-
rights-police_us_58767eb3e4b092a6cae4ac97 (noting that during his confirmation hearing, Senator Sessions 
testified, “I think there’s concern that good police officers and good departments can be sued by the Department 
of Justice when you just have individuals within a department who have done wrong[.]”).  
 17. A multitude of proposals for reform of policing practices have been offered by others. Seth Stoughton, 
a former police officer who now teaches law at the University of South Carolina, has suggested that police 
departments should embrace more of a “guardian” mentality, rather than a “warrior” mentality. Seth W. Stough-
ton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611, 614, 666–75 
(2016); see also Delgado, supra note 3, at 1543 (suggesting a new approach to policing with “cops as guardians 
or even friends”). Stephen Rushin has argued that Congress should expand federal oversight of policing. 
STEPHEN RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 4 (2017). Sunita Patel has pro-
posed more community involvement in public-law efforts to reform police departments. Sunita Patel, Towards 
Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for Community Engagement Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 793, 798, 867–77 (2016); see also Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 
521, 545–54 (2015) (discussing deliberative democracy as a theory for including public participation in police 
decision-making). Lorie Fridell has supported the use of role plays and incorporation of implicit-bias training to 
help police officers overcome implicit bias. Lorie Fridell, This Is Not Your Grandparents’ Prejudice: The Im-
plications of the Modern Science of Bias for Police Training, TRANSLATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY, Fall 2013, at 11–
13, http:/cebcp.org/wp-content/TCmagazine/TC5-Fall2013. Many have urged police departments to equip their 
officers with body-worn cameras. Ryan Pulley, Law Enforcement and Technology: Requiring Technological 
Shields to Serve and Protect Citizen Rights, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 459, 492–93 (2016) (advocating body-
worn camera implementation as a means of holding law enforcement accountable and exonerating officers com-
mitting no misconduct); David A. Harris, What Criminal Law and Procedure Can Learn from Criminology, 7 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 196–97 (2009) (urging video and audio recordings of searches and seizures as one 
method to increase compliance with the Fourth Amendment); see also Chavis, supra note 11, at 1007–13 (of-
fering a model body-worn camera policy and discussing best practices for implementing body-worn camera 
programs). Some have even proposed disarming the police. Paul Takagi, A Garrison State in “Democratic” 
Society, CRIM. & SOC. JUST. 1, 10 (1974) (“Perhaps the only immediate solution at this time is to disarm the 
police . . . [to] lower the rate of police killings of civilians[.]”); James Jacobs, Disarming the Police Would Make 
Gun Control Effective, in GUN CONTROL 42, 43 (Charles P. Cozic ed., 1992) (noting that disarming police would 
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at the departmental level.18 I proposed the use of high-definition simulators cou-
pled with a shooting program aimed at both reducing racial bias and increasing 
accuracy in the decision to shoot.19 I also recommended that police officers be 
required to engage in regular and ongoing traditional martial arts training as a 
way to train officers to remain calm in situations of danger and to minimize the 
impulse to shoot.20 Traditional martial arts training, which usually includes med-
itation before and after each practice, could help officers remain calm in danger-
ous situations and hone their intuitive skills, which could help officers better 
identify truly dangerous individuals, choose the right course of action, and in-
crease their confidence and ability to handle combative suspects.21 
In this Article, I focus on doctrinal reform, suggesting model legislation on 
police use of deadly force. Existing statutes on police use of deadly force tend 
to focus on the reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the need to use force. I 
argue that the law should be reformed to include a focus on the reasonableness 
of the officer’s actions. Under my model statute, for a shooting to be considered 
justifiable, both the officer’s beliefs and actions must have been reasonable. To 
provide better guidance to juries than current use-of-force statutes, my model 
statute specifies three factors the fact finder must consider when deciding 
whether the officer believed and acted reasonably: (1) whether the victim/sus-
pect had or appeared to have a weapon (and whether he or she refused orders to 
drop it), (2) whether the officer engaged in de-escalation measures prior to using 
deadly force, and (3) any preseizure conduct by the officer that increased the 
risk of a deadly confrontation. Tracking traditional self-defense doctrine, the 
model statute I propose explicitly requires necessity, proportionality, and atten-
tion to the immediacy of the need to use deadly force.22 
My model statute also imports the concept of imperfect self-defense into 
the police use of force arena. If the jury finds that an officer’s belief in the need 
to use deadly force was honest but unreasonable, or if the jury finds that the 
officer’s belief was reasonable but that his use of deadly force was unreasonable, 
the jury may acquit the officer of murder and find him guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter.23  
                                                                                                                                      
set the stage for disarming citizens). I do not support disarming the police. Unless and until we get guns off the 
streets and out of the homes of ordinary citizens, we cannot and should not even think about disarming our 
police. The above-listed reforms are just a few of the many proposals for reform of policing practices.  
 18. Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing and Lethal Force: Remedying Shooter Bias with Martial Arts Training, 
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 150–51 (2016) [hereinafter Lee, Race, Policing and Lethal Force].  
 19. Id. at 160–62. 
 20. Id. at 165–70. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Rachel Harmon has proposed importing the traditional requirements of self-defense doctrine—neces-
sity, imminence, and proportionality—into Fourth Amendment law on when police use of force is excessive. 
Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1166–83 (2008). The Supreme 
Court’s decisions in this area suggest that the Court would be resistant to adopting Harmon’s helpful suggestion. 
Unlike the Supreme Court, state legislators are more sensitive to the demands of the public, so state law reform 
might be possible if there is sufficient public pressure to reform these laws. 
 23. In states that recognize the defense of imperfect self-defense, a person charged with murder can be 
found guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of murder if she honestly, but unreasonably, believed that the 
force used was necessary or was attacked with nondeadly force and wrongfully escalated the conflict by using 
deadly force in response. See, e.g., In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994). 
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I recognize the limits of criminal prosecution as a vehicle for police reform. 
As my colleague Mary Cheh has noted: “Criminal law can punish, and in some 
instances, deter police brutality, but it cannot of itself force fundamental change 
in how a department is run, supervised, led, and made accountable.”24 Because 
criminal prosecutions of police officers “occur within a structure designed to 
protect individual defendants through procedural safeguards, including rights to 
counsel, to confront witnesses, to a jury and against self-incrimination and, most 
important, the requirement that the government prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt,”25 many of these officer-involved shooting prosecutions result in either a 
hung jury or a not guilty verdict.  
Changing the law on police use of deadly force may not have an immediate 
impact on what judges and juries do in homicide prosecutions involving police 
officers claiming that they acted in self-defense. Results will vary depending on 
the jurisdiction, as different communities have differing views on police, but 
many judges and jurors will not want to convict an officer who used deadly force 
thinking his or her life, or the life of another person, was in danger. Many juries 
will continue to acquit police officers no matter what the legal standard is, ex-
cept, perhaps, in the most egregious cases where there is clear evidence that the 
victim/suspect did not pose a threat of danger to the officer or anyone else.26 
Judges and jurors know that police officers have a difficult job to do. They may 
feel it is unfair to send an officer to jail if the officer employed deadly force 
believing it was necessary to protect his or her life or the life of another person.  
Despite the fact that reforming the law on police use of deadly force may 
not result in more guilty verdicts, it may encourage police officers on the ground 
to act with more care before using deadly force, which should be the ultimate 
goal. We want police officers to exercise appropriate care and caution before 
using deadly force. The instinct to defend oneself will always be present in any 
situation when an officer is contemplating the use of deadly force. Reforming 
the law in a way that encourages the use of deadly force only when it is propor-
tionate and necessary can provide a useful counter to that self-preservation in-
stinct. 
Even though the changes in the law I am proposing may not have an im-
mediate impact on jury verdicts in officer-involved shooting cases, changing the 
law may influence what juries do in the long run. Today, jurors may feel that an 
officer’s use of force was not appropriate, but because the current legal standard 
                                                                                                                                      
 24. Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING 
AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 247, 247 (Geller & Toch eds., 1996). 
 25. William Yeomans, The Red Herring in Prosecuting Officers: Washington Post Opinion, OREGONIAN 
(May 27, 2016), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/05/the_red_herring_in_prosecuting.html 
(opining that the acquittal of Officer Nero, one of the five Baltimore police officers charged with homicide in 
the death of Freddie Gray, is a reminder that criminal prosecution of police officers is “an unreliable tool for a 
national reckoning on race and policing”). 
 26. Even in such cases, some jurors may hesitate to convict. For example, in the case involving the shoot-
ing of Walter Scott, a Black man who was stopped for a nonfunctioning brake light, even though Officer Michael 
Slager was caught on video shooting the unarmed Scott while he was trying to run away, at least one juror 
refused to convict, resulting in a hung jury. Simon et al., supra note 10. Slager later pled guilty to a federal 
criminal charge. Matt Zapotosky & Wesley Lowery, Ex-Officer Pleads Guilty in S.C., WASH. POST (May 3, 
2017), https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20170503/281590945467498. 
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suggests that an officer is justified as long as his belief in the need to use such 
force is reasonable, jurors may feel they must acquit. By requiring juries to find 
that both the officer’s beliefs and actions were reasonable, my model statute 
focuses the jury’s attention on whether the objective facts suggest that the of-
ficer’s response was proportionate and necessary.  
Changing the law may also encourage prosecutors to bring charges against 
police officers who shoot and kill under questionable circumstances. Prosecutors 
today are often reluctant to bring charges against officers, even when the cir-
cumstances surrounding a shooting suggest that it was not a justifiable shooting, 
for a host of reasons. Prosecutors may consider police officers to be “on the same 
team,” which may bias them in ways they do not even realize.27 Prosecutors may 
fear that police officers will retaliate by refusing to testify favorably in other 
cases if one of their own has been charged.28 Prosecutors may also be concerned 
about bringing charges when the chances of success are very small.29 Current 
law contributes to this concern by favoring the officer at almost every step of the 
way.30 My model statute tries to be more balanced than current law, giving pros-
ecutors a better chance at securing a conviction in cases where a conviction is 
appropriate. 
Much of what I am proposing is already part of many police department 
regulations,31 which do not have the force of law and are unenforceable.32 The 
things I suggest juries should be directed to consider when assessing the reason-
ableness of an officer’s use of force are measures that many police chiefs 
                                                                                                                                      
 27. Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1450 (2014); see also 
Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) 
(“[P]rosecutors often enjoy too close of a relationship with local police and are therefore reluctant to turn against 
those with whom they have worked.”). 
 28. As Kate Levine has noted:  
[Prosecutors] rely on the police for successful convictions, and therefore, must have a good working rela-
tionship with the police for professional advancement. A prosecutor who reports police crimes or advo-
cates zealous prosecution of the police will necessarily run afoul of law enforcement’s good graces, which 
may impact conviction rates and therefore her career advancement. 
Id. at 1472.  
 29. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (noting that prosecutorial charging decisions are 
influenced by a number of factors, including the strength of the case, which impacts the likelihood of conviction). 
 30. For example, many courts do not allow juries to consider whether less deadly alternatives were avail-
able to the officer. See infra cases cited in note 198. Many courts do not permit the jury to consider preseizure 
conduct by the officer that created the risk of a deadly confrontation. See infra cases cited in note 249; see also 
Cover, supra note 8, at 1773 (explaining how the law on qualified immunity makes it virtually impossible for a 
civilian to obtain redress against an officer who has violated his constitutional rights). 
 31. Cf. infra notes 201 and 241. 
 32. The mere fact that an officer violated a police regulation is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. 
Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that “violation of a police department regulation 
is insufficient for liability under section 1983”); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that, when determining whether an officer’s use of deadly force was reasonable, the issue is whether the officer 
“violated the Constitution or federal law, not whether he violated the policies of a state agency”); Edwards v. 
Baer, 863 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[P]olice department guidelines do not create a constitutional right.”). 
Moreover, some courts have held that whether the officer violated police policy is irrelevant to whether the 
officer’s use of force was lawful. Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1161–62 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
police department’s standard operating procedures are inadmissible in excessive force claims because they are 
“irrelevant to the federal claims and likely to cause jury confusion regarding the state claims”); Greenidge v. 
Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that an officer’s violation of standard police procedures is 
not relevant to whether the officer acted reasonably in using deadly force). 
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acknowledge are critically important.33 The advantage of my model legislation, 
if adopted by state legislatures, would be that it would have the force of law. 
Because of its enforceability in a court of law, an enacted statutory provision 
would have far more potential to shape police culture than internal police regu-
lations. 
My model statute responds to a call to action raised by NYU law professor 
Barry Friedman in his recently published book, Unwarranted: Policing without 
Permission.34 Professor Friedman, the lead reporter on the American Law Insti-
tute’s current Policing Project, observes that we are quick to criticize the police 
but fail to recognize the extent to which we are to blame for problematic policing 
practices.35 We are at fault, according to Professor Friedman, because we—or, 
more accurately, our legislators—have not written rules to govern police prac-
tices, but have allowed the police to police themselves.36 My model statute is 
one attempt to provide better rules to govern police use of deadly force. 
II. THE LAW ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 
Currently, there is no federal statute governing police use of deadly force.37 
Police use of force in the United States is governed by U.S. Supreme Court case 
law, state statutes, and state case law. Supreme Court jurisprudence on when 
police force is considered excessive and in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
is what governs in civil lawsuits brought by individuals claiming excessive use 
of force by police officers.38 State use-of-force laws govern in criminal prosecu-
tions against police officers charged with homicide or assault.39 While U.S. Su-
preme Court jurisprudence on excessive force and state laws on when deadly 
force is justifiable are similar in many ways, they operate in separate realms. If 
a state has a statute governing police use of force, then that state statute and state 
case law, not U.S. Supreme Court case law, controls in a state criminal prosecu-
tion of a law enforcement officer for homicide or assault. Conversely, in a Sec-
tion 1983 civil action against a law enforcement officer alleging that the officer 
used excessive force, U.S. Supreme Court case law controls, not state law. I 
                                                                                                                                      
 33. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, DEFINING MOMENTS FOR POLICE CHIEFS 25, 26, 28, 58 (May 2015) 
(encouraging consideration of preseizure conduct and de-escalation measures). 
 34. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION (2017). 
 35. Id. at 15. 
 36. Id. at 27. 
 37. H.R. 1529, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY FORCE: POLICE USE OF 
LETHAL FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (2015). In 2015, Representative John Conyers introduced legislation 
entitled The Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 2015. See Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 
2015, H.R. 2875, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). This legislation, which sought the development of national 
standards for the accreditation of law enforcement agencies as well as the development of national standards 
on use-of-force procedures, stalled in committee. See Melissa Nann Burke, Conyers Pushes Police Accountabil-
ity, Crime Reforms, DETROIT NEWS (July 23, 2015, 3:21 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/poli-
tics/2015/07/23/rep-conyers-police-accountability-crime-reforms/30580027/ (noting that the legislation intro-
duced by Representative Conyers would force the adoption of uniform standards to enhance communities’ ability 
to hold law enforcement accountable). 
 38. It also governs in federal prosecutions of federal law enforcement officers accused of excessive force. 
See Law Enforcement Misconduct, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/law-enforcement-misconduct 
(last updated July 28, 2017). 
 39. MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 442 (2d ed. 2014). 
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examine both the leading U.S. Supreme Court cases on whether and when the 
use of force by a law enforcement officer is excessive and, therefore, unconsti-
tutional and state use-of-force laws. 
A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases on the Meaning of Excessive Force 
Tennessee v. Garner,40 Graham v. Connor,41 and Scott v. Harris42 are the 
leading U.S. Supreme Court cases on when the use of force by a law enforcement 
officer is excessive and, therefore, unconstitutional. In Garner, a police officer 
responding to a “prowler inside” call observed an African American43 teenager 
named Edward Garner running across the backyard of a home that had just been 
broken into.44 With the aid of a flashlight, the officer saw Garner’s face and 
hands and guessed that Garner was seventeen or eighteen years old.45 Garner 
was actually fifteen years old.46 The officer, who later admitted that he was rea-
sonably sure Garner was unarmed, called out, “police, halt.”47 When Garner be-
gan climbing over the fence, the officer shot him in the back of the head, fearing 
that if Garner made it over the fence, he would elude capture.48 Garner was taken 
to a hospital where he died on the operating table.49 “Ten dollars and a purse 
taken from the house were found on his body.”50 
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court criticized the common law rule 
in effect in Tennessee and other states at the time, which permitted an officer to 
use whatever force was necessary, including deadly force, to effectuate the arrest 
of a fleeing felon. Rejecting the common law rule, the Court held that “[t]he use 
of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the cir-
cumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable.”51 The Court explained that only 
                                                                                                                                      
 40. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 41. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 42. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 43. The Court does not mention Garner’s race in its opinion, but several sources report that Edward Garner 
was Black. Mary Maxwell Thomas, The African American Male: Communication Gap Converts Justice into 
“Just Us” System, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 6 (1997); Jerry R. Sparger & David J. Giacopassi, Memphis 
Revisited: A Reexamination of Police Shootings After the Garner Decision, 9 JUST. Q. 211, 212 (1992). 
 44. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Social science research suggests that individuals tend to think 
Black kids are older than they really are. In one study, for example, Philip Atiba Goff showed pictures of boys 
of various ages and races to individuals, told them that the boys were suspected of a particular crime, then asked 
the subjects to guess the ages of the boys in the photos. See, e.g., Philip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Inno-
cence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 530 (2014). 
In case after case, the subjects thought the Black kids were much older than White and Latino kids of the same 
age, suspected of the same crime. Id. at 532. They also thought the Black kids were more culpable (blameworthy) 
for their actions than the White or Latino kids. Id. Goff did the same experiment on police officers and found 
that police officers also overestimated the age of Black and Latino kids suspected of crime, while not overesti-
mating the age of White children. Id. at 535. Black thirteen-year-old kids were repeatedly perceived to be adults. 
Id. 
 47. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3–4. 
 48. Id. at 4. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 11. 
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where an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of seri-
ous physical harm, either to the officer or to others, is it constitutionally reason-
able to prevent escape by using deadly force:52  
[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable 
cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or 
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if 
necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been 
given.53 
Garner was widely understood as establishing two clear guidelines regard-
ing when police officers can use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon. First, deadly 
force should not be used unless the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the 
suspect poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others, 
and second, an officer should, if feasible, give a warning prior to using deadly 
force.54 
The number of persons shot and killed by police decreased dramatically 
after the Garner decision, in large part because many police departments, which 
had previously embraced the common law rule, changed their policies to con-
form to the decision.55 After the decision was announced, approximately 30% of 
the most populous cities’ police departments revised their policies to conform to 
it.56 The remaining 70% did not revise their policies because their policies were 
already in accordance with, or more restrictive than, Garner.57 The new legal 
standard announced in Garner, coupled with the net increase in the number of 
police departments with more restrictive shooting policies after Garner, resulted 
in a substantial reduction in both the number of police shootings and the number 
of persons shot and killed by police,58 offering an example of how a change in 
the law can have a significant impact on the ground.  
Four years after deciding Garner, the Court retreated from its embrace of 
clearly defined guidelines for police use of deadly force. In Graham v. Connor, 
Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, “felt the onset of an insulin reaction,” and asked a 
friend, William Berry, to take him to a nearby store so he could buy some orange 
juice.59 Berry did so, but when Graham entered the convenience store and saw a 
long line of people waiting to check out, he quickly left the store.60 
                                                                                                                                      
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 11–12. 
 54. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 793–94 (9th Cir. 2014); Vaughan v. Cox, 343 
F.3d 1323, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2003); Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 99–100 (5th Cir. 1997); Krueger v. 
Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1993).  
 55. Abraham N. Tennenbaum, The Influence of the Garner Decision on Police Use of Deadly Force, 85 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 241, 255–56 (1994) (finding that overall police shootings declined by 16% follow-
ing the Garner decision).  
 56. Samuel Walker & Lorie Fridell, Forces of Change in Police Policy: The Impact of Tennessee v. Gar-
ner, 11 AM. J. POLICE 97, 101 (1992). Of the one hundred large cities surveyed, four did not respond. See id. at 
109–10.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 107; see also Sparger & Giacopassi, supra note 43, at 224 (finding that, after the Memphis Police 
Department revised its shooting policy to conform to Tennessee v. Garner, the overall number of shootings and 
the racially discriminatory application of lethal force in Memphis declined significantly). 
 59. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
 60. Id. at 388–89. 
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Officer Connor, an African American police officer with the Charlotte, 
North Carolina, Police Department,61 happened to see Graham enter and rapidly 
exit the store.62 Officer Connor suspected that Graham, an African American 
male,63 had stolen something from the store, so he followed and then stopped 
Berry’s car about a half mile from the store.64 Berry told Officer Connor that his 
friend Graham was suffering from a sugar reaction.65 Officer Connor told the 
two men to wait in the car.66 When Officer Connor went back to his patrol car 
to call for backup, Graham got out of the car, ran around it twice, and then passed 
out briefly.67 
Several officers arrived at the scene in response to Officer Connor’s call 
for backup.68 One officer handcuffed Graham’s hands tightly behind his back, 
ignoring Berry’s pleas for sugar for Graham.69 Another officer said, “I’ve seen 
a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted like this. Ain’t nothing wrong 
with the M.F. but drunk. Lock the S.B. up.”70 Several officers lifted the uncon-
scious Graham up and placed him face down on the hood of Berry’s car.71 When 
Graham regained consciousness, he asked the officers to check his wallet for a 
diabetes decal that he carried.72 In response, one of the officers insisted that he 
“shut up” and subsequently shoved his face against the hood of the car.73 Four 
officers then grabbed Graham and threw him headfirst into the police car.74 A 
friend of Graham’s brought some orange juice to the car, but the officers refused 
to give the juice to Graham.75 Finally, after Officer Connor received a report that 
Graham had done nothing illegal at the convenience store, the officers drove him 
home and released him.76 
Graham suffered a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and 
an injured shoulder as a result of his encounter with the police.77 He also devel-
oped a loud ringing in his right ear that continued long after the incident.78 Gra-
ham brought suit against the individual officers involved in the incident, alleging 
                                                                                                                                      
 61. More Perfect, Mr. Graham and the Reasonable Man, RADIOLAB (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www. 
wnyc.org/story/mr-graham-and-reasonable-man. 
 62. Garner, 480 U.S. at 389. 
 63. While the opinion does not mention Graham’s race, it appears Graham was a Black man. Court v. Cop 
Misconduct, ELYRIA CHRON. TELEGRAM, Oct. 13, 1989, at A4 (“Graham, who is black, says police handcuffed 
him, then dumped him in his yard”). 
 64. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389. The Supreme Court has held that an officer needs reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts to stop an individual. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 
(1968). The Graham Court, however, did not seem concerned that entering and quickly exiting a convenience 
store hardly seems to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
 65. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. “M.F.” stands for “mother fucker” and “S.B.” stands for “son of a bitch.” 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 390. 
 78. Id. 
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that they had used excessive force in making the investigatory stop in violation 
of his constitutional rights.79 The case was tried before a jury, but the jury did 
not get to decide the case.80 After the defense finished presenting its case and 
before the case went to the jury, the officers moved for a directed verdict.81 The 
district court applied a four-factor test82 and granted the officers’ motion for a 
directed verdict, finding that the amount of force used by the officers was ap-
propriate under the circumstances.83 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied the correct 
legal standard in assessing Graham’s claim of excessive force.84 The Supreme 
Court reversed, not because it felt the officers used excessive force, but because 
the lower courts erred in applying the Due Process Clause to assess whether the 
force the officers used against Graham was excessive.85 
The Court held that all claims alleging excessive use of force by a law 
enforcement official during an arrest, stop, or other seizure of a person must be 
analyzed for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment as opposed to the Due 
Process Clause.86 Importantly, the Graham Court declined to set clear guidelines 
for police use of force. Instead, the Court stated that “determining whether the 
force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amend-
ment requires a careful balancing of . . . the individual’s Fourth Amendment in-
terests against the . . . governmental interests . . . .”87 Acknowledging that this 
balancing test “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,”88 
the Court explained that: 
[I]ts proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 
arrest by flight.89 
                                                                                                                                      
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 390–91. 
 81. Id. 
 82. The district court considered the following four factors in assessing whether the officers applied ex-
cessive force against Graham:  
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force that 
was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) “[w]hether the force was applied in a good faith 
effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing 
harm.”  
Id. at 390 (quoting Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986)). 
 83. Id. at 390–91. 
 84. Id. at 391. 
 85. Id. at 397–99. 
 86. Id. at 388. 
 87. Id. at 396. 
 88. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). 
 89. Id. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9). 
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The Court explained that in conducting reasonableness balancing, courts 
should apply an objective standard of reasonableness.90 The officer’s actual in-
tent or motive is irrelevant in this objective inquiry.91 Moreover, “[t]he ‘reason-
ableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the twenty-twenty vision of 
hindsight.”92 “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the 
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in cir-
cumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of 
force that is necessary in a particular situation.”93 Finally, the Court noted that 
an officer does not have to be correct in his assessment of the need to use force. 
The Fourth Amendment is not violated merely because an officer was mistaken, 
as long as his mistake was reasonable.94 
One problem with the Graham Court’s embrace of reasonableness is that 
racial stereotypes about Blacks and other racial minorities can affect perceptions 
of whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable. Blacks are often associated 
with aggression, violence, and criminality.95 The negative association between 
Blacks and crime is so common that it has a name: the Black-as-Criminal stere-
otype.96 In acknowledging the prevalence of racial stereotypes, I am not sug-
gesting that all, nor even most, police officers are racist. Indeed, most people 
today, including most police officers, do not endorse the stereotype or believe 
that all Blacks are criminals.97 Nonetheless, most people cannot help being af-
fected by stereotypes, including this one. A wealth of research on implicit social 
                                                                                                                                      
 90. Id. at 397. 
 91. Id. In a footnote, however, the Court noted that “in assessing the credibility of an officer’s account of 
the circumstances that prompted the use of force, a fact finder may consider, along with other factors, evidence 
that the officer may have harbored ill-will toward the citizen.” Id. at 399 n.12. 
 92. Id. at 396. 
 93. Id. at 396–97. 
 94. Id. at 396. 
 95. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL 
COURTROOM 138–46 (NYU Press 2003) [hereinafter LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN] (discussing 
the Black-as-Criminal stereotype); Lee, Race and Self Defense, supra note 14, at 403 (discussing negative ste-
reotypes about Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2045 (2011); Kelly Welch, Black Criminal Stereotypes and Racial Profil-
ing, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276, 278 (2007). Professor Donald Jones has pointed out that the way the Black-
as-Criminal stereotype is deployed changes depending on the context: “In his classroom, or on our screens, 
dressed in a dapper pinstripe suit Henry Louis Gates is received with applause, not suspicion. Similarly, Evan 
Howard on the campus of Morgan State College is generally safe. And shopping at Target or Walmart, Trayvon 
would have had no trouble buying a belt. But when they cross certain lines they [are] thrust into a police regime 
in which their mere presence creates a presumption of criminality. Thus a Black man who lives in a ghetto zip 
code finds himself a perpetual suspect, stopped 257 times…How do we explain this dualism: blacks have 
achieved incredible vertical and horizontal integration in our society. Yet the notion that blacks are inherently 
criminal is widely, if subliminally held.” D. MARVIN JONES, DANGEROUS SPACES: BEYOND THE RACIAL PROFILE 
43 (2016). 
 96. LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 95, at 138–54 (providing examples of different 
ways the Black-as-Criminal stereotype operates to harm African Americans); Lee, Race and Self Defense, supra 
note 14, at 402–23 (discussing the Black-as-Criminal stereotype). 
 97. See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD 
PEOPLE 47 (2013). 
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cognition has repeatedly demonstrated that even the most egalitarian-minded in-
dividuals are implicitly biased in favor of Whites over Blacks.98 Implicit racial 
bias can encourage police officers and others to perceive danger when dealing 
with a Black individual, even when that individual does not, in fact, pose a threat 
of violence.99 
And it is not just Blacks who are subjected to negative racial stereotypes. 
Latinos are also commonly stereotyped as criminal and dangerous.100 Muslim 
and Middle Eastern Americans are commonly stereotyped as terrorists.101 
It is noteworthy that both of the individuals who were the subjects of police 
force in Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor were African American, 
although this fact is not apparent from a simple reading of either opinion.102 
Many of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment opinions ignore race even 
when consideration of race would likely change the analysis. For example, in 
Terry v. Ohio,103 the Supreme Court’s well-known opinion allowing police of-
ficers to stop and frisk individuals upon reasonable suspicion, the Court never 
mentioned the races of the suspects or the police officer. In Stopping the Usual 
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, Anthony Thompson critiques the 
Terry v. Ohio Court for its failure to acknowledge that two of the suspects were 
Black and that the third suspect and the officer who stopped and frisked the men 
were White.104 Thompson also explains how the racial dynamics of the case 
likely influenced not only the officer who suspected the men were involved in 
criminal activity, but also the Justices on the Supreme Court who found the of-
ficer’s suspicions reasonable.105  
Similarly, in Florida v. Bostick,106 a bus-sweep case in which the Supreme 
Court modified the “free to leave” test for a seizure of a person, the Court ig-
nored the race of the defendant and of the officers who questioned and searched 
                                                                                                                                      
 98. Id. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit 
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1475 (1998). For an excellent examination of how 
implicit racial bias manifests itself in different areas of the law and society, see generally IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012). A recently published book on implicit bias 
in the law, published by the American Bar Association, provides practical strategies for judges and attorneys 
interested in overcoming implicit bias. See generally ENCHANTING JUSTICE, REDUCING BIAS (Redfield ed., 
2017). 
 99. Cynthia Lee, But I Thought He Had a Gun: Race and Police Use of Deadly Force, 2 HASTINGS RACE 
& POVERTY L.J. 1, 60 (2004) (documenting numerous cases in which an unarmed Black individual was shot and 
killed by an officer who mistakenly thought the suspect/victim had a gun); Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing, and 
Lethal Force, supra note 18, at 160 (discussing shooter bias studies showing that most individuals are quicker 
to shoot an unarmed Black person than an unarmed White person). 
 100. Brian Rodriguez, Latinos and the Criminal Justice System: Overcoming Racial Stigma from Trial to 
Incarceration, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. ONLINE 7, 2 (2015), http://tmlawreview.org/assets/uploads/2015/03/La-
tinos-and-The-Criminal-Justice-System-Brian-Rodriguez-volume-40-issue-.71.pdf; Mary Romero, State Vio-
lence, and the Social and Legal Construction of Latino Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1081, 1090 (2001).  
 101. Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in A Post-9/11 America, 
47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 477–78 (2012).  
 102. See supra  notes 43 & 63. 
 103. See 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
 104. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 956, 962–73 (1999). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
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him. In (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, Devon Carbado critiques the Bostick 
Court’s color-blind approach and explains how acknowledging that the defend-
ant was Black and the officers were White would have yielded a more realistic 
analysis and most likely a different answer to the question whether a reasonable 
person in the defendant’s shoes would have felt free to terminate the encounter 
with the police than the analysis Justice O’Connor suggested.107 
Failure to acknowledge the significance of race is not limited to Supreme 
Court opinions. Racially charged criminal cases are often handled with the same 
color-blind approach. The trial of George Zimmerman, the man who shot and 
killed Trayvon Martin, is an example of this. At trial, the judge made clear she 
was running a color-blind trial and was not going to allow any reference to racial 
profiling.108 The prosecution assured the judge that it was not going to talk about 
racial profiling.109 One of the prosecutors even told the jurors during his closing 
argument that the case was not about race despite widespread popular belief that 
the case was all about race.110 Many people thought the reason Zimmerman was 
not charged initially was because he had shot an unarmed Black male and that if 
the victim had been White, he would have been charged right away. 
A second problem with the Graham Court’s embrace of reasonableness 
balancing is that it fails to provide meaningful guidance to lower courts, attor-
neys, and litigants regarding whether and when a police officer’s use of deadly 
force is justified, which is precisely the question it is supposed to help answer. 
While it is true that the Graham Court lists several factors, “including the sever-
ity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actually resisting arrest or at-
tempting to evade arrest by flight,”111 to weigh in the balance, it provides little 
other guidance. As Rachel Harmon notes:  
Graham permits courts to consider any circumstance in determining 
whether force is reasonable without providing a standard for measuring 
relevance, it gives little instruction on how to weigh relevant factors, and 
it apparently requires courts to consider the severity of the underlying 
                                                                                                                                      
 107. Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 977–78 (2002) (cri-
tiquing Justice O’Connor’s colorblind approach to the question of whether a Black man questioned by two White 
law enforcement officers in Florida v. Bostick would have felt free to terminate the encounter or decline the 
officers’ requests). 
 108. See Cynthia Lee, Denying the Significance of Race: Colorblindness and the Zimmerman Trial, in 
TRAYVON MARTIN, RACE, AND AMERICAN JUSTICE: WRITING WRONG 31, 31 (K.J. Fasching-Varner et al. eds., 
2014) [hereinafter Lee, Denying the Significance of Race] (examining the reasons why the judge, prosecutor, 
and defense attorneys in the Zimmerman case treated the case as if it had nothing to do with race); Cynthia Lee, 
(E)Racing Trayvon Martin, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 91, 102 (2014) [hereinafter Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin] 
(providing a critical race critique of the Zimmerman trial, more commonly known as the Trayvon Martin case); 
see also Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 14 (examining the ways in which implicit racial bias manifested 
in the Trayvon Martin case). 
 109. Lee, Denying the Significance of Race, supra note 108 at 31–32; Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin, 
supra note 108, at 105. 
 110. See CrimeTimeVids, Trayvon Martin: George Zimmerman Trial Closing Arguments Day 14 Part 3, 
YOUTUBE (July 12, 2013) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xatLPHKCXyY&feature=em-share_video_user. 
 111. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
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crime in all cases, a circumstance that is sometimes irrelevant and mislead-
ing in determining whether force is reasonable.112  
Harmon also points out that since Graham, the lower courts have not sig-
nificantly developed the law on excessive use of force by police.113 
Fast forward eighteen years to 2007 when the Court held in Scott v. Harris 
that a police officer’s act of ramming his patrol car into the back of a suspect’s 
vehicle during a high-speed chase, causing the vehicle to crash and rendering 
the African American114 driver a quadriplegic, was reasonable under the circum-
stances.115 Victor Harris, the person whose car the police rammed, argued that 
the officer’s actions were not justified since the officer did not have probable 
cause to believe that Harris posed a threat of death or serious bodily injury to the 
officer or others, as required by Tennessee v. Garner, when the officer rammed 
his patrol car into Harris’s car.116 Notably, the Court rejected Victor Harris’s 
attempt to have the Court follow Tennessee v. Garner, recasting Garner as 
simply an application of Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing rather 
than a bright-line rule for police officers contemplating the use of deadly force 
against a fleeing felon.117 
Justice Scalia, writing for eight members of the Court, felt that the dash 
cam video clearly showed that the officer did not use excessive force, claiming 
“Respondent’s [Victor Harris’s] version of events is so utterly discredited by the 
record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.”118 Justice Scalia con-
tinued, “[i]t is clear from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and im-
minent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to 
other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.”119 
                                                                                                                                      
 112. Harmon, supra note 13, at 1130. As an example of this, Harmon notes that even though the crime at 
issue in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), was speeding—not an extremely serious or violent offense—the 
Court found the officer’s use of deadly force in that case reasonable. Harmon, supra, at 1133. 
 113. Id. at 1131 (“There has been no substantial advance over the Supreme Court’s formulation, no further 
attempt at a test or a structure, almost nothing to help officers, victims, juries, or the public understand the nature 
of legitimate police force.”). 
 114. The Court does not mention Victor Harris’s race, but Harris is described as a nineteen-year-old Afri-
can American male in other sources. Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title 
VII: An Examination of Ricci v. DeStefano, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 865, 871 (2012). It appears that Harris is 
African American in a YouTube video, featuring Harris. Vic2k3, Why I Ran., YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2009), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JATVLUOjzvM (interview with Victor Harris, explaining why he fled from po-
lice). 
 115. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007).  
 116. Harris, 550 U.S. at 381–82. 
 117. Id. at 382. Rachel Harmon laments that in rejecting the factors articulated in Tennessee v. Garner as 
central to analyzing reasonableness, the Scott v. Harris Court not only emasculated Garner, it also “reduced the 
Fourth Amendment regulation of reasonable force to its vaguest form: an ad hoc balancing of state and individual 
interests unconstrained by any specific criteria.” Harmon, supra note 13, at 1136–37. 
 118. Harris, 550 U.S. at 380. As Brandon Garrett and Seth Stoughton note, the Scott v. Harris Court 
weighed the “relative culpability” of the officer and the victim of the force, even though comparative fault is a 
novel concept in Fourth Amendment law. Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 
103 VA. L. REV. 211, 236 (2017). Garrett and Stoughton also note that while the Court was quick to compare 
the actions of the victim to the actions of the officer, it “failed to compare the actions of the officers in this case 
with the actions that may have been taken by well-trained police officers—actions that may have avoided the 
high-speed chase or the need to use deadly force.” Id. 
 119. Harris, 550 U.S. at 384. 
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Justice John Paul Stevens, however, explained in his dissent that he viewed 
the same videotape and came to the opposite determination.120 In Justice Ste-
vens’s opinion, Harris did not pose an actual and imminent threat to the lives of 
the officer or others.121 Responding to the majority’s concern for the lives of 
pedestrians placed at risk from Harris’s attempt to flee, Justice Stevens noted, 
“[t]he Court’s concern about the ‘imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians 
who might have been present,’ . . . while surely valid in an appropriate case, 
should be discounted in a case involving a nighttime chase in an area where no 
pedestrians were present.”122 Justice Stevens further pointed out that all the of-
ficer had to do was stop chasing Harris, and any threat posed by the car chase 
would have ended.123 
The three judges on the court of appeals and the district court judge who 
heard the case below also felt that the officer’s use of force was not reasona-
ble.124 It is hard to say that Justice Stevens, the three judges on the court of ap-
peals, and the U.S. district court judge, all of whom thought the officer used 
excessive force, were not reasonable people reflecting the views of at least some 
of the individuals who might have served on Harris’s jury had the case not been 
dismissed on summary judgment. 
After the Harris decision, Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald 
Braman conducted a study to examine the validity of the majority’s claim that 
no reasonable juror would believe Victor Harris’s version of events.125 They 
showed more than 1,000 individuals the video of the high-speed chase at issue 
in Harris and asked these individuals whether they thought it was reasonable for 
the officer to ram Victor Harris’s car to prevent him from fleeing.126 Not sur-
prisingly, they found disagreement over whether the officer’s use of force was 
reasonable.127 Certain groups of individuals, including African Americans, low-
income workers, individuals from the Northeast, and individuals who self-iden-
tified as liberal and Democrat, tended to view the officer’s actions as unreason-
able and excessive.128 Individuals who embraced hierarchical and individualistic 
values, in contrast, tended to agree with the Court’s view of the case and saw the 
officer’s acts as reasonable.129 Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman concluded that cul-
tural values influenced the way individuals perceived the reasonableness of the 
officer’s actions and that this fact alone suggested it was inappropriate for a case 
involving questions regarding the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly 
                                                                                                                                      
 120. Id. at 395–96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 121. Id. at 393. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 393–94. 
 124. Harris v. Coweta Cty., 433 F.3d 807, 815 (11th Cir. 2005); Harris v. Coweta Cty., No. 3:01-CV-148-
WBH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348, at *16 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003).  
 125. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 (2009). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 841. 
 129. Id.  
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force to be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment as opposed to a jury 
trial.130 
The Supreme Court has not followed Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman’s ad-
vice. On November 9, 2015, the Court issued a per curiam opinion granting 
qualified immunity to a police officer who shot and killed a man who had led 
police on a high-speed chase. In Mullenix v. Luna, Israel Leija, Jr., a twenty-
four-year-old Latino male,131 led police on a high-speed chase after an officer 
approached his car and informed him that he was under arrest.132 During the 
chase, Leija called 911, said he had a gun, and threatened to shoot police officers 
if they did not call off the chase.133 Officer Mullenix joined the effort to catch 
Leija and suggested shooting at Leija’s car to disable it.134 Officer Mullenix 
asked the dispatcher to inform his supervisor of his plan and to ask the supervisor 
if he thought Mullenix should shoot at Leija’s car.135 Leija’s estate claimed that 
Officer Mullenix heard his supervisor telling him to stand by and wait to see if 
the spike strips set in place by the other officers would disable Leija’s vehicle 
when it reached a particular overpass, but Officer Mullenix did not follow his 
supervisor’s suggestion.136 Approximately three minutes after Officer Mullenix 
exited his vehicle, he spotted Leija’s vehicle as it approached the overpass.137 
Instead of waiting to see if the spike strips would disable the vehicle, he fired 
six shots at the vehicle.138 Four of the six shots hit Leija, killing him.139 
Leija’s estate sued Officer Mullenix, claiming he used excessive force.140 
Mullenix moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity.141 The 
doctrine of qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money 
damages unless the plaintiff can show “(1) that the official violated a statutory 
or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time 
of the challenged conduct.”142  
The district court denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment on the 
ground that genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the officer acted reck-
lessly or reasonably.143 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
                                                                                                                                      
 130. Id. at 881. 
 131. See Fatal Encounters Database, FATAL ENCOUNTERS, https://archive.org/details/perma_cc_65MJ-
H76F (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). 
 132. Mullenix v. Luma, 136 S. Ct. 305, 306 (2015).  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 306–07. 
 136. Id. at 307. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982)). Avidan Cover explained that, in an excessive force case, qualified immunity confusingly involves two 
similar inquiries into the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct. Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right 
Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773, 1807 (2016). First, the constitutional (or merits) inquiry asks 
whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable. Id. Second, the clearly established inquiry asks whether the 
officer’s use of force was reasonable in light of legal precedent. Id.  
 143. Mullenix, 136 S.Ct. at 307.  
LEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018  10:35 AM 
No. 2] REFORMING THE LAW ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 651 
 
court’s denial of Officer Mullenix’s motion for summary judgment and con-
cluded that Officer Mullenix was not entitled to qualified immunity.144 The court 
of appeals found that Officer Mullenix’s actions were objectively unreasonable 
since there was no threat to innocent bystanders, Leija’s driving was relatively 
controlled, and the officer did not make a split-second decision to shoot.145 
The Supreme Court reversed.146 Without deciding whether Officer Mul-
lenix acted unreasonably in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court con-
cluded that, given its precedents, it could not conclude that Mullenix violated 
clearly established law.147 Even though there were genuine issues of fact as to 
whether the officer acted reasonably, facts best left to a jury representative of 
the community to sort out, Leija’s family was not able to litigate those facts in a 
court of law because the Court found that the officer was entitled to qualified 
immunity for his actions.148 
Justice Sotomayor, the sole Justice to dissent from the Court’s ruling, 
blamed the Court for supporting a “shoot first, think later” culture of policing.149 
She noted that when Officer Mullenix confronted his supervisor after the shoot-
ing, his first words were “How’s that for proactive?,” referencing an earlier 
counseling session in which his supervisor had suggested Mullenix was not en-
terprising enough.150 Justice Sotomayor lamented: 
[T]he comment seems to me revealing of the culture this Court’s decision 
supports when it calls it reasonable . . . to use deadly force for no discern-
ible gain and over a supervisor’s express order to “standby.” By sanction-
ing a “shoot first, think later” approach to policing, the Court renders the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.151 
Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, Texas is another example of the Su-
preme Court favoring the police officer over the civilian in a case involving dis-
puted facts that probably should have gone to a jury.152 Around midnight on 
October 29, 2010, Houston Police Officer Chris Thompson, who was manning 
a speed gun on the freeway, observed a truck weaving in and out of traffic.153 
Officer Thompson turned on his lights and sirens and pulled over Ricardo Sala-
zar-Limon, a Mexican national.154 After running a check on Salazar-Limon’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 144. Id. at 307–08. 
 145. Id. at 308. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 310. 
 148. Id. at 307, 312. 
 149. Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.; see also Mark Joseph Stern, Sonia Sotomayor Takes a Stand Against Police Brutality, SLATE 
(Nov. 9, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/11/sonia_so-
tomayor_dissents_in_mullenix_police_shooting_case.html. 
 152. 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1277–78 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 153. Id. at 1279 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 154. Stephanie Mencimer, These Four Cases Will Quickly Show Who Gorsuch Really Is, MOTHER JONES 
(Apr. 7, 2017, 8:43 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/gorsuchs-impact-likely-be-immediate 
(noting that Salazar-Limon was a twenty-five-year-old Mexican immigrant, lawfully in the country and un-
armed, at the time of the incident and that Officer Thompson’s shooting left him paralyzed from the waist down); 
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driver’s license, which did not reveal any outstanding warrants, Officer Thomp-
son returned to Salazar-Limon’s truck and asked Salazar-Limon to step out of 
the vehicle.155 Officer Thompson tried to put Salazar-Limon into handcuffs so 
he could conduct a blood-alcohol test.156 Salazar-Limon resisted and a brief 
struggle ensued.157 At the end of this struggle, Salazar-Limon turned away from 
the officer and began to walk back to his car.158 The officer drew his firearm and 
told Salazar-Limon to stop.159 
What happened next is a matter of dispute. According to the officer, after 
he told Salazar-Limon to stop, Salazar-Limon’s hands went to his waistband as 
if he was reaching for a weapon, and Salazar-Limon turned toward him.160 Sal-
azar-Limon, in contrast, claimed that Officer Thompson shot him in the back 
right after telling him to stop and that when the bullet hit him, he began to turn 
toward the officer, then fell to the ground.161 No gun was ever recovered from 
the scene.162 
Salazar-Limon sustained crippling injuries as a result of being shot in the 
back.163 He sued Officer Thompson and the City of Houston, alleging that his 
constitutional rights were violated.164 Defendants Thompson and the City of 
Houston moved for summary judgment, arguing that Officer Thompson was en-
titled to qualified immunity.165 The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the officer and the City of Houston.166 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.167 
Salazar Limon filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.168 
The Supreme Court denied Salazar-Limon’s petition on April 24, 2017, holding 
that the lower court acted responsibly and did not conspicuously fail to apply the 
governing legal rule.169 Justice Alito, concurring in the denial of certiorari, found 
noteworthy the fact that Salazar-Limon never denied reaching for his waist-
band.170 
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, argued that it 
was error for the courts below to resolve the case on summary judgment since 
summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as to 
                                                                                                                                      
Mark Joseph Stern, The Empty Waistband, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2017 6:05 PM), http://www.slate.com/arti-
cles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/04/justice_sotomayor_takes_aim_at_police_brutality_in_sala-
zar_limon_v_houston.html. 
 155. Salazar-Limon, 137 S. Ct. 1279 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1282. 
 163. Id. at 1283. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1280. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1277 (majority opinion). 
 169. Id. at 1278 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 170. Id. at 1277. 
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any material fact.”171 In deciding whether there are disputed facts in question, a 
court is supposed to view the facts in the light most favorable to the party op-
posing the motion for summary judgment—in this case, in the light most favor-
able to Salazar-Limon.172 In this case, Justice Sotomayor noted, there was a gen-
uine dispute over whether Salazar-Limon reached for his waistband.173 Under 
Officer Thompson’s account of the events, he shot Salazar-Limon after he saw 
Salazar-Limon turn and reach for his waistband.174 Under Salazar-Limon’s ac-
count, Thompson fired immediately after telling Salazar-Limon to stop and be-
fore Salazar-Limon turned toward him.175 When Salazar-Limon turned and 
whether Salazar-Limon reached for his waistband were material facts because, 
if Salazar-Limon turned and reached for his waistband before he was shot, Of-
ficer Thompson’s use of force was reasonable; if Salazar-Limon did not reach 
for his waistband and did not turn toward the officer until after he was shot, 
Officer Thompson’s use of force was excessive.176 Justice Sotomayor noted, 
“The most natural inference to be drawn from Salazar-Limon’s testimony was 
that he neither turned nor reached for his waistband before he was shot—espe-
cially as no gun was ever recovered.”177 If he did not have a gun on him, why 
would he have reached for his waistband? Justice Sotomayor concluded that the 
Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari: 
continues a disturbing trend regarding this Court’s resources. We have not 
hesitated to summarily reverse courts for wrongly denying officers the pro-
tection of qualified immunity in cases involving the use of force. But we 
rarely intervene when courts wrongly afford officers the benefit of quali-
fied immunity in the same cases. The erroneous grant of summary judg-
ment in qualified-immunity cases imposes no less harm on “society as a 
whole,” than does the erroneous denial of summary judgment in such 
cases.178 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent is particularly noteworthy in light of the fact 
that in many police shooting cases involving a claim that the officer shot the 
suspect because he was reaching for his waistband, it is later found that the sus-
pect was actually unarmed. For example, one study that reviewed six years of 
shootings by Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies found that in two-thirds of 
the shootings where the deputy shot the suspect because he thought the suspect 
was reaching for his waistband, the suspect was actually unarmed.179 
                                                                                                                                      
 171. Id. at 1278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 172. Id. at 1281. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1282.  
 178. Id. at 1282–83. 
 179. MERRICK J. BOBB ET AL., POLICE ASSESSMENT RES. CTR., THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S 
DEPARTMENT 30TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 63 (2011), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5498b74c 
e4b01fe317ef2575/t/54fc751de4b0d3db827f155f/1425831197873/30th+Semi-annual+Report.pdf (“[I]n nearly 
two-thirds of cases where the deputy acted on a waistband movement without seeing a weapon, the suspect had 
no weapon and thus must have been doing something other than arming himself.”); Robert Faturechi, Half of 
L.A. County Deputies’ ‘Waistband Shootings’ Involve Unarmed People, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011), http://ar-
ticles.latimes.com/2011/sep/23/local/la-me-unarmed-shootings-20110923. 
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B. State Laws on Police Use of Deadly Force 
Aside from U.S. Supreme Court case law on when police use of force is 
excessive, the other main source of law on police use of deadly force is state 
law. State laws on police use of deadly force are not uniform. Some states do 
not have any laws on the books governing police use of deadly force, so police 
simply follow their own departmental rules and regulations and U.S. Supreme 
Court case law on the use of force.180 Some states do not require the police of-
ficer to have a reasonable belief in the need to use deadly force, allowing the 
officer’s subjective belief to control.181 Most states, however, permit the police 
to use deadly force if the officer had a reasonable belief that such force was 
necessary under the circumstances.182 
Many of the problems with state statutes on police use of deadly force mir-
ror the problems with the Supreme Court’s excessive force jurisprudence. For 
example, reasonableness, which is the standard in excessive force cases as well 
                                                                                                                                      
 180. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 37, at 4 (listing Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, South Caro-
lina, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia as jurisdictions that lack laws 
on the use of lethal force by law enforcement officers). 
 181. For example, in Nebraska, a police officer is justified in using deadly force if the officer is arresting 
someone for a felony and believes the force employed involves no substantial risk of injury to innocents, and 
either (1) the crime of arrest involved the use or threat of deadly force, or (2) there is a substantial risk that the 
arrestee will cause death or serious bodily injury if apprehension is delayed. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412(3) 
(2015). As recently as 2010, the Nebraska State Legislature considered a bill that would have added the word 
“reasonably” wherever the word “believes” appears in this statute, but this bill was not enacted. Legislative Bill 
889, 101st Leg., 2nd Sess. (Neb. 2010); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(3) (2015) (“A public officer or 
peace officer shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force without malice and with a good faith belief 
that such act is justifiable pursuant to this section.”) (emphasis added). Some use-of-force statutes appear to 
adopt a subjective standard by using the word “police,” but then define “believes” as “reasonably believes.” See, 
e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-307(3) (2015) (“The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless: 
[t]he arrest is for a felony; [and t]he person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a law enforcement officer 
[and t]he actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and 
[t]he actor believes that: [t]he crimes for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threat-
ened use of deadly force; or [t]here is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious 
bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed.”) (emphasis added); id. § 703-300 (“‘Believes’ means ‘reasonably 
believes.’”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 508(a) (2015) (“[A peace officer] is justified in using deadly force only when 
he believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or such other person, 
or when he believes both that: such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or 
escape; and the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony or is attempting to escape and 
possesses a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict serious bodily 
injury unless arrested without delay.”) (emphasis added); id. § 501 (“‘Believes’ or ‘belief.’ Means ‘reasonably 
believes’ or ‘reasonable belief.’”).  
 182. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27(b) (2015); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370(a) (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-410(C) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-610(b) (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-707(2) (2015); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 53a-22(c) (2015); FLA. STAT. § 776.05(3) (2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-5 (2015); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-5227(a) (West 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(A) (2015); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 107(2) 
(2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046(3) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102 (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 627:5(II) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-7(b) (2) (West 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1) (McKinney 
2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2)(a–b) (2015) (authorizing a law enforcement officer to use deadly force 
“to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly 
physical force; [or] to effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody of a person who he reasonably believes 
is attempting to escape by means of a deadly weapon, or who by his conduct or any other means indicates that 
he presents an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to others unless apprehended without delay . 
. . .”) (emphasis added); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.239 (2015); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-7-8, 12-7-9 (2015); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-404 (West 2015).  
LEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018  10:35 AM 
No. 2] REFORMING THE LAW ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 655 
 
as in most use-of-force statutes, is such an open-ended standard; alone, it pro-
vides little-to-no guidance to the jury deciding whether an officer’s use of force 
was justified.  
A second problem involves the fact that reasonableness is usually equated 
with typicality. Because the officer’s beliefs are measured against the beliefs of 
the reasonable officer, understood to mean the average or typical officer, any 
subconscious racial biases that a typical officer might have become part of the 
reasonable officer’s perspective. Racial stereotypes linking certain minorities 
with criminal activity often cause ordinary people to fear those minorities.183 
The same racial stereotypes linking Blacks and other minorities with criminal 
activity that influence most people are likely to influence police officers as 
well,184 especially those who work in high-crime neighborhoods and have re-
peated contact with individuals involved in criminal activity.185 These stereo-
types may also encourage legal decision-makers to find an officer’s belief in the 
need to shoot reasonable, even in cases involving individuals who are shot while 
unarmed or while not actually posing an immediate threat of violence to the of-
ficer or others. 
Another problem with most state statutes on police use of force is that they 
focus on the reasonableness of the officer’s beliefs. If the focus is on the reason-
ableness of the officer’s beliefs, not the reasonableness of his actions, legal de-
cision-makers may be quicker to find an officer’s use of deadly force justified 
even if deadly force was not necessary to control the situation. They might be 
quicker to find an officer’s use of deadly force justified even if the officer’s use 
of force was not proportionate to the force threatened by the suspect. Necessity 
and proportionality, standard features of the defense of self-defense, can easily 
be forgotten if the focus is simply on the reasonableness of the officer’s beliefs. 
This is because focusing on the reasonableness of the officer’s beliefs often ends 
up being an inquiry into the reasonableness of the officer’s fear of the suspect. 
                                                                                                                                      
 183. Because of the strong association between Blacks and violence and criminality, fear that a Black per-
son is armed and dangerous becomes a “reasonable” fear when reasonableness is equated with typicality. Lee, 
Race and Self Defense, supra note 14, at 459 (providing examples of the Black-as-Criminal stereotype); see also 
LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 95, at 138–46 (discussing the Black-as-Criminal stereo-
type and why it is not logical to assume most Blacks are dangerous or prone to criminality). Latinos and Muslims 
are also stereotyped as dangerous and violent. Mary Romero observes that Latino males are characterized as 
“super-predators” who are “violent, inherently dangerous and endangering.” Romero, supra note 100, at 1084. 
Sahar Aziz notes that Muslims are stereotyped as being “inherently prone to terrorism” and “violent, savage, 
and anti-American.” Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 
America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 477–78 (2012). Donald Jones notes that the presumption of criminality that 
attends Blacks, Latinos, and Arab-Americans is amplified depending on where the particular person of color 
finds themselves—for Blacks, the most dangerous space is the inner city; for Arabs, the airport; and for Latinos, 
the border. D. MARVIN JONES, DANGEROUS SPACES: BEYOND THE RACIAL PROFILE (2016). 
 184. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 889 (2004) (finding that police officers, like civilians, tend to associate Blacks with the 
concept of crime).  
 185. Richard T. Ford, Why We Tolerate Biased Policing, BOS. REV. (Jan 22, 2015), http://bostonre-
view.net/blog/richard-thompson-ford-biased-policing (“Police who work in poor high-crime neighborhoods of 
color have countless experiences that reinforce racial prejudice.”); cf. David Klinger et al., Race, Crime, and the 
Micro-Ecology of Deadly Force, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 193 (2015) (finding neither racial composition 
of neighborhood nor their level of disadvantage directly increases the frequency of police shootings). 
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Finally, the vast majority of statutes on justifiable police use of force do 
not track the requirements of traditional self-defense doctrine, which apply to 
ordinary civilians. In most police use-of-force statutes, there is no imminence 
requirement. The officer need not reasonably believe he or she is faced with an 
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury before using deadly force. As 
explained in details above, many use-of-force statutes appear to include a pro-
portionality requirement, but do not actually require proportionality. And while 
most use-of-force statutes include language suggesting a necessity requirement, 
those same statutes permit an officer to use deadly force even if that force was 
not actually necessary. I discuss proportionality and necessity at greater length 
below. 
1. Proportionality 
In most states, a civilian charged with a criminal homicide claiming self-
defense needs to show that her use of deadly force arose out of an honest and 
reasonable belief that she was being threatened with death or serious bodily in-
jury. In other words, a civilian claiming self-defense needs to show that her use 
of force was proportional to the force threatened. Not so when it comes to police 
officers in many jurisdictions. In many states, proportionality is not required 
when an officer uses deadly force to effectuate an arrest or prevent the escape of 
a fleeing felon. 
Many state statutes appear to have a proportionality requirement but do not 
actually require proportionality. These statutes may permit a police officer to 
use deadly force if the officer reasonably believes such force is necessary to: (1) 
effectuate the arrest of a felon; (2) prevent a felon’s escape; or (3) protect the 
officer or another person from a threat of death or serious bodily injury posed 
by the suspect.186 One or more conditions may give these laws the appearance 
of a proportionality requirement, but if there is an “or” before the last clause, an 
officer would be justified in using deadly force even if the suspect posed no 
threat of death or serious bodily injury. 
                                                                                                                                      
 186. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27(b) (“A peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon another 
person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary in order (1) to make an arrest for a felony 
or to prevent the escape from custody of a person arrested for a felony, unless the officer knows the arrest is 
unauthorized; or (2) to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or immi-
nent use of deadly physical force.”) (emphasis added); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-
16-32 (2015) (providing that “[h]omicide is justifiable if committed by a law enforcement officer . . . (3) [i]f 
necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice”); id. § 22-16-33 (providing that “[h]omicide is 
justifiable if necessarily committed in attempting . . . to apprehend any person for any felony committed . . . .”); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2)(c) (permitting a law enforcement 
officer to use deadly force if it appears reasonably necessary to “prevent the escape of a person from custody 
imposed upon him as a result of a conviction for a felony”); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.239(1) (“[A] peace officer 
may use deadly physical force only when the peace officer reasonably believes that: (a) The crime committed 
by the person was a felony or an attempt to commit a felony involving the use or threatened imminent use of 
physical force against a person; or (b) The crime committed by the person was kidnapping, arson, escape in the 
first degree, burglary in the first degree or any attempt to commit such a crime; or . . . (d) The crime committed 
by the person was a felony or an attempt to commit a felony and under the totality of the circumstances existing 
at the time and place, the use of such force is necessary; or (e) The officer’s life or personal safety is endangered 
in the particular circumstances involved.”) (emphasis added). 
LEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018  10:35 AM 
No. 2] REFORMING THE LAW ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 657 
 
For example, Alabama’s statute on police use of deadly force tracks the 
above language. In Alabama, a police officer may use deadly force if the officer 
reasonably believes it necessary: 
(1) To make an arrest for a felony or prevent the escape from custody of a 
person arrested for a felony, or 
(2) To defend himself or a third party from the immediate use of deadly 
physical force.187 
This means that if a police officer is trying to arrest a man suspected of 
shoplifting, a felony in Alabama,188 the officer is legally permitted to use deadly 
force against the shoplifter if the officer reasonably believes such force is nec-
essary to effectuate the arrest. This would be the case even if the officer knows 
that the suspect is unarmed and poses no risk of harm to the officer or another 
person. While appearing to require proportionality, the Alabama statute allows 
officers to use deadly force to make an arrest or prevent the escape of a fleeing 
felon so long as the officer believes that the use of deadly force is reasonably 
necessary to make that arrest or prevent that escape, even if the officer does not 
believe that the individual poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily 
injury to the officer or others.189 
Similarly, in Alaska, a police officer may use deadly force if she reasona-
bly believes such force is necessary to  
arrest or terminate the escape or attempted escape from custody of a person 
the officer reasonably believes (1) has committed or attempted to commit 
a felony which involved the use of force against a person; (2) has escaped 
or is attempting to escape from custody while in possession of a firearm 
on or about the person; or (3) may otherwise endanger life or inflict serious 
bodily injury unless arrested without delay.190 
This provision sounds reasonable at first glance, but because the word “or” sep-
arates the last two clauses, the statute would permit an officer to shoot someone 
who, while stealing an iPhone from a person on the street, pushed that person.191 
The push would constitute the use of force against a person, and if the iPhone 
was worth over $750, the theft would constitute a felony in Alaska.192 Because 
the Alaska statute does not specify that the felon must have used or threatened 
deadly force upon a person, it permits an officer to use deadly force on someone 
like our hypothetical iPhone snatcher who has not used and does not threaten to 
use deadly force.193 
Another way that state statutes on police use of force can undermine pro-
portionality is by following the old common law rule permitting police officers 
                                                                                                                                      
 187. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27(b)(1–2) (emphasis added). 
 188. Theft of property worth more than $500 but less than $1,499 is a class D felony under Alabama law. 
ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4.1. 
 189. Id. § 13A-3-27(b)(1–2). 
 190. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370(a)(1–3) (2015). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Theft of property worth more than $750 but less than $25,000 is a class C felony under Alaska law. 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130. 
 193. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370(a)(1–3). 
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to use any amount of force necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon. 
Surprisingly, some states continued to follow the old common law rule even 
after it was rejected in Tennessee v. Garner.194 In states that still follow the com-
mon law rule today, a police officer is permitted to use deadly force if the officer 
reasonably believes it necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon, even if 
the officer does not believe the suspect poses a threat of death or serious bodily 
injury. 
Contrary to common belief, statutes that retain the common law rule by 
permitting an officer to use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon 
even if the individual does not pose a threat of death or serious bodily injury to 
the officer or another, are not necessarily unconstitutional even though they con-
tradict the holding of Tennessee v. Garner. Tennessee v. Garner was a civil suit 
brought by Garner’s estate against the officer who shot Garner. The standards 
set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court for determining whether force is excessive, 
and therefore unconstitutional, apply when an officer is sued for excessive force 
under 42 U.S.C. §1983. State use-of-force statutes, not Supreme Court case law, 
govern in criminal prosecutions. As Chad Flanders and Joseph Welling explain, 
“Garner involved the application of the [common law] standard within a federal 
civil rights statute, not in a state criminal prosecution.”195 “The standards for 
criminal liability in a state criminal prosecution do not have to mimic the stand-
ards for a constitutional tort.”196 In states that adhere to the common law rule, an 
officer may be able to escape criminal liability if prosecuted for his use of deadly 
force even if the officer’s actions could subject him to Section 1983 civil liability 
under Tennessee v. Garner.197 
2. Necessity 
In most states, a civilian charged with murder or manslaughter claiming 
self-defense would need to show he or she reasonably believed it was necessary 
to use deadly force to counter a threat of death or serious bodily injury. If the 
civilian could have used nondeadly force to escape the threatened harm, it would 
be hard to conclude that the civilian’s belief in the necessity of using deadly 
force was a reasonable belief. This is because a less deadly alternative was avail-
able.  
Most state laws on police use of deadly force are silent on whether the jury 
may consider whether less deadly alternatives to using deadly force were avail-
                                                                                                                                      
 194. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27(b)(1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (1)(d) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 161.239 (1)(d) (2015); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-9 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-33 (2015); see 
also Chad Flanders & Joseph Welling, Police Use of Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years After Garner, 35 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 121 (2015) (naming several states that have retained the common law rule, 
including Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and 
Michigan). In 2016, Missouri finally abandoned the common law rule and changed its use-of-force statute to 
comport with Tennessee v. Garner. H.B. 2332, 98th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 195. Flanders & Welling, supra note 194, at 125. 
 196. Id. at 126.  
 197. Id. at 128 (“The substantive criminal law of the fifty states does not have to meet a constitutional 
standard of reasonableness.”). 
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able to the officer. Courts addressing this issue are split over whether the avail-
ability of less deadly alternatives is a relevant factor that the jury may consider 
when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force. Many courts do 
not allow the jury to consider whether there were less deadly alternatives, claim-
ing the availability of less deadly alternatives is irrelevant to whether the of-
ficer’s use of force was reasonable.198 It is understandable that courts concerned 
about juries second-guessing the police officer have tended to reject the idea of 
allowing the jury to consider whether less deadly alternatives were available and 
not used, but this automatic rejection does not seem appropriate given that as-
sessments of reasonableness are supposed to involve a consideration of the to-
tality of the circumstances.199 Moreover, if a less deadly alternative was availa-
ble—if an officer could have effectuated the arrest, prevented the escape, or 
countered the threat without resorting to deadly force—it is difficult to conclude 
that the officer’s use of deadly force was necessary. For these reasons, many 
courts do permit the jury to consider whether less deadly alternatives were avail-
able but not used in assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force.200 
Additionally, many police departments recognize that an officer should employ 
deadly force only if no lesser alternatives are available.201 
                                                                                                                                      
 198. See, e.g., Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Alternative measures which 20/20 hind-
sight reveal to be less intrusive (or more prudent), such as waiting for a supervisor or the SWAT team, are simply 
not relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.”); Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (“We do not 
believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use 
of deadly force is reasonable . . . .”); United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 
1994) (“We must avoid ‘unrealistic second-guessing’ of police officers' decisions . . . and thus do not require 
them to use the least intrusive means in the course of a detention, only reasonable ones.”); Cole v. Bone, 993 
F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that while “other courses of action, such as another stationary roadblock, 
might conceivably have been available,” a seizure need only be objectively reasonable, not the most prudent 
course of conduct); Posey v. Davis, No. 11-1204, 2012 W. Va. LEXIS 883, *12 (W. Va. 2012) (“[I]t is irrelevant 
that plaintiff’s expert came forward with other reasonable alternatives [less likely to injure].”); Mata v. City of 
Farmington, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1219, 1227 (D.N.M. 2011) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require that 
an officer use the least-intrusive alternative available to protect himself or others so long as the method chosen 
is reasonable.”); Taylor v. Hudson, No. CIV 02-0775 JB/RHS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26736, at *18 (D.N.M. 
Nov. 21, 2003) (“[E]vidence of less intrusive alternatives is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
inquiry . . . .”). 
 199. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“Because ‘[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,’ however, its proper application re-
quires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case . . . .”) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). 
 200. Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Whether listed in Graham,] [o]ther 
relevant factors include the availability of less intrusive alternatives to the force employed . . . .”); Chew v. Gates, 
27 F.3d 1432, 1440 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the availability of alternative methods of capturing or 
subduing a suspect may be a factor to consider” in determining whether a particular application of force was 
unreasonable); Estate of Crawley v. McRae, Case No. 1:13-CV-02042-LJO-SAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
123132, at *78 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (“A court may also consider other factors relevant to the particular circum-
stances, such as the availability of less intrusive alternatives [in assessing whether an officer used excessive 
force].”); Estate of Heenan v. City of Madison, 111 F. Supp. 3d 929, 942 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (“The failure to use 
an alternative, non-deadly force is not dispositive, although whether such an alternative existed is a factual ques-
tion that may weigh on a trier of facts’ ultimate determination of objective reasonableness.”) (emphasis in orig-
inal); Becker v. City of Evansville, No. 3:12-cv-182-WGH-TWP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8414, at *37 (S.D. 
Ind. 2015) (“[T]he availability of other means of apprehension presents a relevant consideration in the Graham 
analysis”). 
 201. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 34 (Mar. 2016) [hereinafter 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE] (noting that the Philadelphia Police Department’s mission statement 
provides, “The application of deadly force is a measure to be employed only in the most extreme circumstances 
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One exception to the general rule that a civilian claiming self-defense must 
honestly and reasonably believe it necessary to use deadly force to protect 
against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury is the no-duty-to-
retreat rule that exists in a majority of states.202 A no-duty-to-retreat rule has 
long been a part of American self-defense doctrine.203 As far back as 1921, the 
U.S. Supreme Court supported a no-duty-to-retreat rule, noting that “[d]etached 
reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.”204 Today, 
thirty-three states allow individuals to use deadly force in self-defense without 
requiring retreat.205 In these no-duty-to-retreat states, sometimes called “Stand 
Your Ground” states, an individual can use deadly force in self-defense against 
another individual even if a safe retreat is known and available.  
Seventeen states do require individuals using deadly force in self-defense 
to retreat if a safe retreat is known and available.206 In these duty-to-retreat 
                                                                                                                                      
and all lesser means of force have failed or could not be reasonably employed.”); see also POLICE EXEC. 
RESEARCH FORUM, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DE-ESCALATION AND MINIMIZING USE OF FORCE 26 (Aug. 
2012) [hereinafter AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DE-ESCALATION] (noting that the Madison, Wisconsin Police 
Chief believes officers should try to use the minimum amount of force necessary).  
 202. See infra note 205. 
 203. Garrett Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the 
Evolution of the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule,” 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 305 (1992). 
 204. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
 205. For a helpful chart with detailed information on stand-your-ground laws by state, see Tamara F. Law-
son, Stand Your Ground Laws 50 State Table (Mar. 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(b) (2015); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370(b) (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-410(C) 
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 776.05(3) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23.1 (2015); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(c)(2) (2015); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5230 (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.055(3) (West 2006); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(C) 
(2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.972(1) (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(4) (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 200.120(2) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4(III) (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.3(a) (2015); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.25(D) (2015); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(2.3) (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-440(C) 
(2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-4 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(2) (2015); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 9.32(c) (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401 (West 2015); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-22(b) (2015); 
WIS. STAT. § 939.48(1)(a) (2015); California v. Zuckerman, 132 P.2d 545, 549 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942); People 
v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341, 347 (Colo. 2000); State v. McGreevey, 105 P. 1047, 1051 (Idaho 1909); People v. Hughes, 
360 N.E.2d 1363, 1369–70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); State v. Bingman, 745 P.2d 342, 348 (Mont. 1987); State v. 
Horton, 258 P.2d 371, 373 (N.M. 1953); State v. Sandoval, 156 P.3d 60, 64 (Or. 2007); State v. Hatcher, 706 
A.2d 429, 435 (Vt. 1997); Foote v. Commonwealth, 396 S.E.2d 851, 855 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Redmond, 
78 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Wash. 2003). At the time this Article was being written, the Ohio State Legislature was 
considering legislation that would eliminate the duty to retreat. Jackie Borchardt, Concealed Carry Bill with 
‘Stand Your Ground’ Provision: How They Voted, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 21, 2014, 2:13 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/03/concealed_carry_bill_with_stan.html (noting that the Ohio 
State House passed HB 203, eliminating the duty to retreat. House Bill 203 died in the Senate due to opposition 
from the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association and the Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio. Andrew Shepper-
son, Stand-Your-Ground Gun Bill Revived in Ohio, GUNS.COM (Aug. 16, 2017), www.guns.com/2017/ 
08/16/stand-your-ground-gun-bill-revived-in-ohio/. On August 15, 2017, the Ohio Senate introduced Senate Bill 
180, which would eliminate the duty to retreat. Id.; Jason Aubry, Ohio Senate Debates Proposed ‘Stand Your 
Ground’ Bill, NBC4i (Nov. 14, 2017, 6:41 PM), http://nbc4i.com/2017/11/14/ohio-senate-debates-proposed-
stand-your-ground-bill/. Senate Bill 180 was referred to the Judiciary Committee on September 7, 2017. Senate 
Bill 180, The Ohio Legislator, https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-status?id=GA132-SB-
180. 
 206. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-607(b)(1)(A) (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b) (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, § 464(e)(2) (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(b) (2015); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 
§ 108(2)(C)(3)(a) (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1409(4)(b) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b) 
(West 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(b) (2015); 
State v. Sedig, 16 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 1944); Redcross v. State, 708 A.2d 1154, 1157–58 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1998); Commonwealth v. Toon, 773 N.E.2d 993, 999 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 
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states, if a safe retreat is known and available to the defendant and she uses 
deadly force without retreating, she loses the right to claim self-defense.207  
Some states do not require retreat but allow the jury to consider whether a 
safe retreat was known and available in assessing the reasonableness of the de-
fendant’s belief in the need to act in self-defense.208 In these jurisdictions, if a 
safe retreat was known and available to the defendant, the jury may rely on this 
fact to decide that it was not reasonable for the defendant to believe he needed 
to use deadly force to protect himself from imminent death or serious bodily 
injury.209 
While a majority of states do not impose a duty to retreat prior to using 
deadly force in the civilian context, most states do require a person who is the 
initial aggressor to retreat prior to using deadly force unless the initial aggressor 
completely withdraws from the affray and successfully communicates his with-
drawal to the other person.210 This is the rule even in Stand-Your-Ground states. 
In contrast, most statutes on police use of force do not contain an initial aggres-
sor limitation. 
III. MODEL LEGISLATION 
In this Section, I propose model legislation on police use of deadly force 
that would require a finding that both an officer’s beliefs and actions were rea-
sonable before an officer’s use of deadly force could be deemed justifiable.211 
My model statute is different from most police use-of-force statutes in several 
ways. First, it specifies that jurors must consider the reasonableness of the of-
ficer’s actions, not just the reasonableness of his beliefs.  
Second, my model statute, unlike most current statutes on when police use 
of force is justifiable, lists three factors the jury must consider when trying to 
decide whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable. What counts as a rea-
                                                                                                                                      
405, 413 (Minn. 2006); State v. Miller, 653 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Walker, 598 N.E.2d 
89, 90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); State v. Silvia, 836 A.2d 197, 200 (R.I. 2003); State v. Jackson, 681 S.E.2d 17, 21 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2009); Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 760 (Wyo. 1995). 
 207. Under what is known as the castle doctrine, if one is attacked in one’s home in a duty-to-retreat state, 
one need not retreat before using deadly force even if a safe retreat is known and available. JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §18.02[C][3] (7th ed. 2015) (citing Wilson v. State, 7 A.3d 197, 204 n.3 (Md. 
2010)). 
 208. Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979) (holding that the law of the District of Colombia 
“does not impose a duty to retreat but does allow a failure to retreat, together with all the other circumstances, 
to be considered by the jury in determining if there was a case of true self-defense”); State v. Wenger, 593 
N.W.2d 467, 471 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that under Wisconsin law, the ability to retreat “goes to the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct”). 
 209. See, e.g., Wenger, 594 N.W.2d at 471 (“[W]hether the opportunity to retreat was available may be a 
consideration regarding whether the defendant reasonably believed the force used was necessary to prevent or 
terminate the interference.”). 
 210. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (6th ed. 2012) (noting that “the only way [a 
deadly aggressor] may regain the right of self-defense is by withdrawing in good faith from the conflict and 
fairly communicating that fact, expressly or impliedly, to his intended victim”). 
 211. I have proposed a similar change to the law of self-defense. See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief 
Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
191, 236–37 (1998) [hereinafter Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine]. 
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sonable use of force will change over time, but because the meaning of reason-
ableness evolves in specific doctrinal contexts, the more meaning law-makers 
can give to the term “reasonableness,” the better.212 
One of the factors specified in my proposal—whether the deceased or in-
jured person was or appeared to be in possession of a deadly weapon and refused 
an order to drop the object or any other order reasonably related to officer 
safety—is obviously relevant. A jury could find an officer’s use of deadly force 
was reasonable if the suspect had or appeared to have a deadly weapon and re-
fused orders to drop it. Even in an open-carry state (a state that permits citizens 
with the proper licensing to carry firearms in public), it is reasonable for an of-
ficer to view a person carrying a gun as potentially dangerous.213 An officer can-
not know whether an individual with a gun is a law-abiding citizen or a person 
who will not hesitate to shoot the officer. Anyone with a gun can lift, point, and 
fire it within a matter of seconds. It is not reasonable to ask an officer to wait 
until a person who has refused an order to drop a gun starts to lift it before the 
officer can fire; if the officer does wait, it may be too late.214 
The second factor—whether the officer engaged in de-escalation measures 
before using deadly force—is also relevant to the question whether the officer’s 
use of deadly force was reasonable because it goes to the necessity of using that 
force. De-escalation techniques include increasing distance between an officer 
and a subject, trying to calm down a combative subject, waiting for backup and 
a supervisor to arrive, and trying to resolve situations without deadly force when 
a suspect is unarmed.215 If an officer rushes into a situation and immediately uses 
deadly force without first trying to take steps to peacefully resolve the situation, 
it is difficult to say that the officer’s use of deadly force was reasonable. 
More and more police organizations are recognizing de-escalation as a way 
to make policing safer. For example, in January 2017, “[a] group of 11 national 
police organizations issued a model policy for police departments nationwide 
that for the first time incorporates the concept of ‘de-escalation’ when an officer 
is facing the choice of using deadly force.”216 The model policy states that “[a]n 
officer shall use de-escalation techniques and other alternatives to higher levels 
of force consistent with his or her training whenever possible and appropriate 
                                                                                                                                      
 212. California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu made this point at the ALI’s Annual Meeting in May 
2017 during discussion of the ALI’s Policing Project. Justice Goodwin Liu, American Inst. 95th Annual Meeting 
(May 2017).  
 213. Gun Carry Laws Can Complicate Police Interactions (NPR radiobroadcast July 19, 2016), http:// 
www.npr.org/2016/07/19/486453816/open-carry-concealed-carry-gun-permits-add-to-police-nervousness. 
 214. See J. Pete Blair et al., Reasonableness and Reaction Time, 14 POLICE Q. 323, 336 (2011) (explaining 
that the process of perceiving a suspect’s movement, interpreting the action, deciding on a response, and exe-
cuting the response generally takes longer for a police officer than it will take a suspect to shoot, even when the 
officer already has his gun aimed at the suspect); see also John Z. Banzhaf, Did Scott in Charlotte Point Gun at 
Officers?—Question May Be Irrelevant, VALUEWALK (Sept. 23, 2016, 3:29 PM), https://www.value-
walk.com/2016/09/keith-scott/; CRAWFORD, infra note 224 (discussing the action-reaction gap in time). 
 215. Tom Jackman, Police Groups Add ‘De-escalation’ to Use of Force Policy, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/01/17/national-police-groups-add-de-esca-
lation-to-new-model-policy-on-use-of-force/?. 
 216. Id. 
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before resorting to force and to reduce the need for force.”217 The Police Exec-
utive Research Forum, also known as “PERF,” a think tank devoted to research-
ing issues involving the police, also supports de-escalation measures.218 
The third factor—whether the officer engaged in any preseizure conduct 
that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation—is also relevant to the question 
of whether the officer’s use of deadly force was reasonable. If the officer created 
the conditions leading to the need to use deadly force, this suggests that his use 
of deadly force was not necessary since the need to use deadly force could have 
been avoided from the beginning. For example, an officer who jumps in front of 
a moving vehicle for no reason, then shoots the driver, claiming that at that mo-
ment he reasonably believed that it was necessary to use deadly force to protect 
himself from death, has engaged in preseizure conduct (jumping in front of the 
moving vehicle for no good reason) that increased the risk of a deadly confron-
tation. Indeed, the officer in this hypothetical created the need to use deadly 
force when that need could have been completely avoided if the officer had not 
jumped in front of the vehicle. Whether the jury should be permitted to consider 
an officer’s preseizure conduct is an issue that has split the lower courts.219 As 
explained in greater detail below, my model statute takes the position that presei-
zure conduct is relevant and should be considered in assessing the reasonable-
ness of an officer’s actions.220 
Third, unlike most use-of-force statutes, my model statute tracks tradi-
tional self-defense doctrine, explicitly requiring necessity, proportionality, and 
attention to timing akin to the imminence requirement in traditional self-defense 
doctrine. Instead of asking whether the threatened force was imminent, however, 
my model statute asks whether the officer’s use of force was immediately nec-
essary. This shift in focus from the imminence of the threatened force to whether 
the use of force was immediately necessary is an innovation borrowed from the 
Model Penal Code.221 It has already been adopted by a few states,222 and is ex-
plained in more detail below. 
                                                                                                                                      
 217. NATIONAL CONSENSUS POLICY ON USE OF FORCE 12–23 (Jan. 2017) (defining de-escalation as 
“[t]aking action or communicating verbally or nonverbally during a potential force encounter in an attempt to 
stabilize the situation and reduce the immediacy of the threat so that more time, options, and resources can be 
called upon to resolve the situation without the use of force or with a reduction in the force necessary” and noting 
that de-escalation “may include the use of such techniques as command presence, advisements, warnings, verbal 
persuasion, and tactical repositioning”).  
 218. See, e.g., AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DE-ESCALATION, supra note 201, at 12–13 (discussing need 
for de-escalation training); GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 201, at 40 (recommending that 
police departments adopt policies and orders making it clear that de-escalation is the preferred tactically-sound 
approach in many critical incidents). The 2016 report provides that “[d]e-escalation policy should . . . include 
discussion of proportionality, using distance and cover, tactical repositioning, “slowing down” situations that do 
not pose an immediate threat, calling for supervisory and other resources, etc.”). GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE 
OF FORCE, supra note 201, at 40.  
 219. See infra notes 249, 250 & 254. 
 220. See Cynthia Lee, Officer Created Jeopardy: Pre-seizure Conduct and the Reasonableness of a Police 
Officer’s Use of Deadly Force (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2016) (“[T]he use of force upon or toward another person 
is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting 
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”). 
 222. HAW. REV. STAT. §703-307(1) (2015) (“[T]he use of force upon or toward the person of another is 
justifiable when the actor is making or assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes that such force is 
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Fourth, my model statute imports the concept of imperfect self-defense into 
the police use-of-force arena. If an officer is charged with murder, the fact finder 
would be permitted to find the officer not guilty of murder but guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter if, for example, the officer’s belief in the need to use deadly force 
was honest but unreasonable. Allowing the fact finder to find the officer charged 
with murder guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter as opposed to facing an 
all-or-nothing choice between guilty and not guilty of murder may reduce the 
risk of a mistrial from a hung jury. 
I outline my proposed model statute below, show how the model statute 
would apply in real life, and then address possible objections to my proposal. 
A. Model Legislation on Police Use of Deadly Force 
I propose that states replace or supplement their current statutes on police 
use of force with the following model statute. My model statute addresses only 
the question of when police can justifiably use deadly force. Current state stat-
utes on police use of force would still govern in cases in which an officer used 
nondeadly force. 
Model Statute on Police Use of Deadly Force 
A. A police officer is justified in the use of deadly force if: 
The officer honestly and reasonably believed deadly force was immediately 
necessary to protect the officer or another from the threat of death or 
serious bodily injury, and 
The officer’s actions were reasonable given the totality of the circum-
stances. 
B. The reasonableness of an officer’s beliefs and actions should be assessed 
from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the defendant officer’s 
shoes. 
C. The jury must consider the following factors along with any other factors 
it deems relevant as part of the totality of the circumstances when as-
sessing whether the officer’s beliefs and actions were reasonable: 
1. Whether the deceased or injured person was, or appeared to be, in pos-
session of a deadly weapon or an object that could be used as a deadly 
weapon and refused to comply with an order to drop the object or any 
other order reasonably related to officer or public safety prior to being 
shot; 
                                                                                                                                      
immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.046.3(2) (2015) (“In effecting an arrest 
or in preventing an escape from custody, a law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force . . . (2) when 
the officer reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is immediately necessary to effect the arrest or 
prevent the escape from custody and also reasonably believes the person to be arrested . . . (c) May otherwise 
endanger life or inflict serious physical injury to the officer or others unless arrested without delay.”). While the 
Hawaii statute appears to require just a subjective belief that the force used was immediately necessary, section 
703-300 defines the word “believes” as “reasonably believes.” HAW. REV. STAT. §703-300. 
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2. Whether the officer engaged in de-escalation measures, such as taking 
cover, waiting for backup, trying to calm the deceased or injured person, 
and/or using less lethal types of force prior to the use of the force in 
question, if such measures were feasible; and 
3. Any preseizure conduct by the officer that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation. 
D. In cases where an officer has been charged with murder, if the officer 
acted with an honest, but unreasonable, belief in the need to use deadly 
force or if his beliefs were reasonable but his actions unreasonable, the 
officer may be found not guilty of murder and guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter. 
E. Definitions 
1. “Deadly force” constitutes force likely or intended to create a substantial 
risk of death or serious bodily injury. 
2. A “deadly weapon” is an inanimate object that, as used or intended, is 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
A few clarifications are in order. First, the short list of factors in the model 
statute is not meant to be exhaustive. It is meant to provide guidance to the jury 
by clarifying a few factors they should consider when assessing the reasonable-
ness of the officer’s use of deadly force. Rather than provide a long list that 
might confuse the jury, the model statute keeps things simple by listing just three 
factors. 
Second, like current law, the proposed reform does not require that the po-
lice officer be correct in his or her assessment of the threat. If an officer thought 
a suspect was armed and it turns out the suspect was unarmed, this does not 
mean that the officer was unjustified in using deadly force. The proposed reform 
just requires the fact finder to find that both the officer’s beliefs and actions were 
reasonable, not that the officer was right. 
Third, like current law, the model statute instructs the fact finder to assess 
the reasonableness of the officer’s beliefs and actions from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer in the shoes of the defendant officer on the scene. Unlike ci-
vilians, police officers undergo extensive training, including training on threat 
perception, and are more attuned than the average citizen to behaviors indicative 
of threat.223 Therefore, it makes sense to assess the reasonableness of an officer’s 
beliefs and actions from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the defendant 
officer’s shoes. 
Assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer in the shoes of the defendant officer comports 
with two concepts that Kimberly A. Crawford, a retired FBI Special Agent, ad-
vises are universal to all law enforcement training regarding the use of force: 
                                                                                                                                      
 223. See Lee, Race, Policing and Lethal Force, supra note 18, at 155–59 (discussing shooter-bias studies 
finding police officers better than civilians at deciding when to shoot). 
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(1) threat identification and (2) action v. reaction.224 Threat identification, Craw-
ford tells us, refers to the fact that human beings are not born knowing how to 
recognize a threat.225 Being able to identify a threat is something that is learned 
through training.226 Law enforcement officers are trained to scrutinize an indi-
vidual’s behavior for signs signaling their intent.227 If an individual is believed 
to be armed, officers are taught to focus on the individual’s hands.228 “If the 
hands move in the direction of a ‘high risk area’ – an area where a weapon might 
be concealed, such as inside a jacket, towards the waistband of pants, or under 
the seat of a car, well-trained officers will immediately identify this as a serious 
threat.”229 
The concept of “action v. reaction” “is simply the recognition that there is 
a certain amount of time required for every person to recognize a stimulus, for-
mulate a response to that stimulus, and then carry out that response.”230 As ap-
plied to a deadly force situation, Crawford explains that:  
[A]ction v. reaction refers to the time it takes for an officer to observe the 
actions of an individual, such as the movement of an individual’s hands, 
perceive those actions as threatening, calculate possible responses to the 
threat, determine what level of force is necessary, and then complete the 
reaction.231 
Crawford notes that “[t]he practical effect of action v. reaction in deadly force 
situations is that officers cannot wait to react until they are absolutely certain of 
an individual’s malicious intent.”232 “If an officer waits to be certain that the 
individual is . . . retrieving a weapon, action v. reaction dictates that the weapon 
could easily be used against the officer before he or she has an opportunity to 
respond.”233 
1. Tracking Civilian Self-Defense Law  
How is the proposed model statute different from current law? First, bor-
rowing from self-defense law that applies to civilians, the proposed statute ex-
plicitly includes a necessity, proportionality, and an immediacy requirement. 
The model statute requires the jury to find that the officer’s actions were reason-
able, and to help the jury assess the reasonableness of the officer’s actions, the 
model statute directs the jury to consider whether there were less deadly alter-
natives known and available but not taken. In this sense, the model statute tracks 
                                                                                                                                      
 224. KIMBERLY A. CRAWFORD, LEGAL INSTRUCTION UNIT, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, REVIEW OF 
DEADLY FORCE INCIDENT: TAMIR RICE 3. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 3–4. 
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the law of self-defense’s focus on whether the force used was reasonably neces-
sary. If there were less deadly alternatives, it is difficult to say that the use of 
deadly force was reasonable.  
The model statute also includes a proportionality requirement, specifying 
that the officer must honestly and reasonably believe deadly force is immedi-
ately necessary to protect the officer or another against a threat of death or seri-
ous bodily injury. The model statute is thus more restrictive than existing state 
use-of-force statutes that allow an officer to use deadly force to effectuate an 
arrest or stop a fleeing felon even if the suspect does not pose a threat of death 
or serious bodily injury to the officer or anyone else.234 Requiring proportional-
ity is extremely important in light of the fact that so many state statutes appear 
to require proportionality when, in fact, they permit officers to use deadly force 
if necessary to effectuate an arrest or prevent escape even if there is no threat of 
death or serious bodily injury.  
In addition to necessity and proportionality, the model statute, like self-
defense doctrine for civilians, requires the jury to focus on the timing of the use 
of force. Many use-of-force statutes, even those that require proportionality, do 
not require a finding that the threat of death or serious bodily injury was immi-
nent, as is required in traditional self-defense doctrine.235 My model statute in-
cludes an immediacy requirement in police use-of-force law for the same rea-
sons that imminence is required in self-defense law. If the suspect did not pose 
an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, or if it was not immediately 
necessary to use deadly force against the suspect at the time the officer shot him, 
then it is hard to say it was necessary at that moment to shoot him.  
Instead of requiring that the threat of death or serious bodily injury be im-
minent, which is the way an imminence requirement appears in most self-de-
fense statutes, I borrow from the Model Penal Code, which uses the language 
“immediately necessary” rather than “imminence” in its self-defense provi-
sion.236 At least two states have adopted “immediately necessary” language in 
their use-of-force statutes.237 Sometimes a person might need to act in self-de-
fense even though the threat of death or serious bodily injury is not imminent at 
that moment because if the person waits until the threat of death or serious bodily 
injury is imminent, it will be too late. Paul Robinson provides a hypothetical that 
illustrates the difference between traditional self-defense doctrine’s focus on the 
imminence of the threat and the Model Penal Code’s focus on whether the force 
the defendant used was immediately necessary: 
Suppose A kidnaps and confines D with the announced intention of killing 
him one week later. D has an opportunity to kill A and escape each morn-
                                                                                                                                      
 234. See supra note 186 (listing state statutes that appear to include a proportionality requirement, but 
actually allow the use of deadly force even when the suspect is not threatening deadly force).  
 235. Flanders & Welling, supra note 194, at 117. 
 236. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2016) (“[T]he use of force upon or toward another person 
is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting 
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”).  
 237. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046 (2015). 
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ing as A brings him his daily ration. Taken literally, the imminent require-
ment would prevent D from using deadly force in self-defense until A is 
standing over him with a knife, but that outcome seems inappropriate. If 
the concern of the limitation is to exclude threats of harm that are too re-
mote to require a response, the problem is adequately handled by requiring 
simply that the response be “necessary.” The proper inquiry is not the im-
mediacy of the threat but the immediacy of the response necessary in de-
fense. If a threatened harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the intended 
victim waits until the last moment, the principle of self-defense must per-
mit him to act earlier—as early as is required to defend himself effec-
tively.238 
Under traditional self-defense doctrine, D’s claim of self-defense would 
have to be rejected if he killed A when A was bringing him his daily ration be-
cause he would not have been facing an imminent threat of death or serious bod-
ily injury. This is because the word “imminence” is generally understood to 
mean impending or about to happen.239 
Under the Model Penal Code, in contrast, D would be able to argue self-
defense if his use of deadly force was immediately necessary. Arguably, it was 
immediately necessary for D to use deadly force at that time because that was 
when D had his only chance to escape near-certain death. Shifting the focus from 
whether the threat of death or serious bodily injury was imminent to whether the 
defendant’s need to use deadly force was immediately necessary is fairer to de-
fendants facing situations where the threat is fairly certain even though not im-
pending. 
Applied to the law enforcement context, we might imagine a situation 
where a police officer has the ability to shoot and disable a suspect who has 
threatened to kill or seriously harm individuals at some specified time in the 
future. Even though the suspect is not, at that exact moment, posing a threat of 
imminent death or serious bodily harm, if the officer hesitates and does not act 
then, the officer may not be able to stop the suspect from killing or seriously 
injuring the individuals later. For example, suppose a suspect has taken a room 
full of hostages and threatens to kill one individual each hour beginning in 
twenty-four hours if the police fail to deliver one million dollars and a helicopter 
for his escape. A police sharpshooter currently has the suspect in his sight and 
can take the suspect out if he shoots the suspect at that moment. The threat of 
death is not imminent because the first hostage is not likely to be killed for an-
other twenty-four hours. The suspect, however, is starting to cover up the win-
dows, so if the police sharpshooter waits another twenty-three hours and fifty-
five minutes, he may not have the ability to stop the suspect from killing the 
hostages because it is unlikely that the suspect will be standing in front of a 
window at that time. This would be a situation where the threat of death is not 
imminent but the need to use deadly force is immediately necessary. 
                                                                                                                                      
 238. 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(c)(1), at 78 (1984). 
 239. State v. Norman, 389 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989) (suggesting “imminent” means “about to happen”); 
Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 12 n.11 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1992) (noting that the word “imminent” traditionally 
is understood to mean near at hand, impending, on the point of happening).  
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2. De-escalation Measures 
Second, the model legislation explicitly permits the jury to consider 
whether the officer engaged in de-escalation measures, such as taking cover, 
talking with the suspect, and using less lethal types of force, if feasible, prior to 
using deadly force. Many police chiefs already acknowledge that de-escalation 
tactics should be used and that officers should try to use less deadly alternatives, 
if feasible, before using deadly force.240 
A number of police departments have adopted regulations that instruct of-
ficers to engage in de-escalation measures or use deadly force only as a last re-
sort.241 Several cities, including Las Vegas and Dallas, have seen a marked re-
duction in the number of fatal police shootings after implementing de-escalation 
measures.242  
                                                                                                                                      
 240. See supra notes 255 & 256. 
 241. See LINCOLN POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER 1510, FORCE AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES (2016) (“Of-
ficers are expected to use de-escalation strategies, when possible, in order to minimize the need for the use of 
control techniques.”); MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T, SPECIAL ORDER § 5-304, THREATENING THE USE OF FORCE 
AND DE-ESCALATION (2016) (“Whenever reasonable according to MPD policies and training, officers shall use 
de-escalation tactics to gain voluntary compliance and seek to avoid or minimize use of physical force. . . . When 
safe and feasible, officers shall: Attempt to slow down or stabilize the situation so that more time, options and 
resources are available.”); SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL MANUAL § 501 (2015) (“If circumstances 
allow, Officers should attempt to de-escalate tense situations through ‘advisements, warnings, verbal persuasion, 
and other tactics’ to reduce the need for force.”); SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, MANUAL, § 8.100 (2015) (“When safe 
and feasible under the totality of circumstances, officers shall attempt to slow down or stabilize the situation so 
that more time, options and resources are available for incident resolution.”); see also DALLAS POLICE DEP’T, 
GENERAL ORDER § 906.01(C), USE OF DEADLY FORCE (2009) (“Deadly force will be used with great restraint 
and as a last resort only when the level of resistance warrants the use of deadly force”) (emphasis added); MIAMI 
POLICE DEP’T, DEPARTMENTAL ORDER 6, USE OF FORCE (2015) (“Respect for human life requires that, in all 
cases, deadly force be used as a last resort . . . . ”); OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, DEPARTMENTAL GENERAL ORDER 
K-3 § 2.1, LETHAL FORCE (2007) (lethal force authorized only if “[a]ll other reasonably available means of 
apprehending the person have failed, are inadequate, or are immediately unavailable”); PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, 
DIRECTIVE 10.1, USE OF FORCE – INVOLVING THE DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS (2015) (“The application of deadly 
force is a measure to be employed only in the most extreme circumstances and all lesser means of force have 
failed or could not be reasonably employed.”); PHX. POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS ORDER 1.5, USE OF FORCE 
(2016) (“Officers are trained to utilize deadly force only as a last resort when other measures are not practical 
under the existing circumstances.”). 
 242. Las Vegas was once considered one of the deadliest jurisdictions in terms of incidents involving police 
use of deadly force, but after the Las Vegas Police Department implemented de-escalation training in 2012 as 
part of a collaborative agreement with the Department of Justice, the number of fatal police shootings and the 
number of officer-involved shooting incidents plummeted. Ricardo Torres-Cortez, Feds Praise Metro on Use-
of-Force Reforms as Police Shootings Plummet, L.V. SUN (Jan. 19, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://lasvegas-
sun.com/news/2017/jan/19/feds-praise-metro-police-transparency-use-of-force/; see also Mike Blasky, Federal 
Report: Las Vegas Police Shootings Down, Department Reforms Up, L.V. REV.-J. (May 23, 2014, 6:47 AM), 
https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/federal-report-las-vegas-police-shootings-down-depart-
ment-reforms-up/; Daniel Hernandez, How One of the Deadliest Police Forces in America Stopped Shooting 
People, QUARTZ (Dec. 4, 2015), https://qz.com/565011/how-one-of-the-largest-police-forces-in-america-
stopped-shooting-people/; The Associated Press, Could Training Stem Police Shootings? Las Vegas Is a Test, 
SEATTLE TIMES (June 22, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/could-training-stem-po-
lice-shootings-las-vegas-is-a-test/. The Dallas Police Department in Dallas, Texas experienced similar results 
after implementing de-escalation training. David Taffet, DPD a Model of De-escalation Training, DALLAS 
VOICE (July 15, 2016), http://www.dallasvoice.com/dpd-model-de-escalation-training-10223260.html. Dallas 
now has the lowest rate of police shootings of any major city in the United States. Id.; Ted Robbins, Dallas Has 
Been Called A Leader in Police Training, Transparency, NPR (July 8, 2016, 5:08 PM), http://www. 
npr.org/2016/07/08/485274691/dallas-has-been-called-a-leader-in-police-training-transparency (noting that the 
number of complaints alleging excessive and improper use of force by Dallas police officers fell from 147 in 
2009 to thirteen through mid-November of 2015); see also Drake Baer, The Dallas Police Force Is Evidence 
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Despite the growing recognition of the benefits of de-escalation by police 
chiefs and others, many courts still do not permit juries to consider whether less 
deadly alternatives were available and not used.243 By including de-escalation 
and less deadly alternatives as factors for the jury to consider, the model statute 
gives officers an incentive to engage in de-escalation measures and consider less 
deadly alternatives before using deadly force. Providing for consideration of de-
escalation measures in the law is more likely than a police regulation to encour-
age a change in police culture since officers know that policies contained in po-
lice rules and regulations are not enforceable in a court of law. 
Including de-escalation as a factor for the jury’s consideration could end 
up helping police officers who do engage in de-escalation measures prior to us-
ing deadly force. An officer who engages in de-escalation measures before using 
deadly force can credibly assert that there was nothing else he could have 
done.244 
It is important to note that the proposed reform does not require a finding 
that the officer was unjustified in using deadly force if the officer could have, 
but did not, engage in de-escalation measures.245 Whether the officer engaged in 
de-escalation measures prior to using deadly force is merely one factor for the 
fact finder to consider when assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. 
The model legislation is drafted to encourage the officer to engage in de-escala-
tion measures prior to using deadly force. If an officer does not engage in such 
                                                                                                                                      
That ‘De-escalation’ Policing Works, CUT (July 8, 2016, 5:05 PM), https://www.thecut.com/2016/07/deescala-
tion-policing-works.html (noting that in 2009, the Dallas Police Department received 147 excessive force com-
plaints and that within five years of implementing de-escalation measures, excessive force complaints were 
down to fifty-three in 2014) (citing Albert Samaha, Dallas Officer-Involved Shootings Have Rapidly Declined 
in Recent Years, BUZZFEED (July 8, 2016, 8:08 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertsamaha/dallas-police-
numbers?utm_term=.hlzyLEa8b#.anwVyM89v.); Michael A. Cohen, Dallas Police Department Leads the Way 
in De-Escalation, BOS. GLOBE (July 9, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/07/08/dallas-police-
department-leads-way-escalation/pxvSK7SpFx86m3mV3UuJbI/story.html; Ryan Grenoble & Andy Campbell, 
In the Face of Violence, Dallas Police Vow to Continue De-escalation Tactics, HUFFINGTON POST (July 8, 2016, 
3:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dallas-police-department-de-escalation_us_577fd030e4b0c5 
90f7e91508; Christopher I. Haugh, How the Dallas Police Department Reformed Itself, ATLANTIC (July 9, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/dallas-police/490583/ (noting that excessive force 
complaints against the department dropped by 64% over a five-year period). Unfortunately, most states do not 
require their police officers to engage in de-escalation training. Curtis Gilbert, Most States Neglect Ordering 
Police to Learn De-escalation Tactics to Avoid Shootings, MPR NEWS (May 5, 2017), http://www.mpr 
news.org/story/2017/05/05/police-de-escalation-training. 
 243. See supra note 198. But see supra note 200 (citing cases saying that the availability of less deadly 
alternatives is a relevant factor and may be considered). 
 244. At Professor Erik Girvan’s suggestion, I thought about including a provision that would give police 
officers a get out of jail free card if the officer or officers engaged in de-escalation measures. See Erik J. Girvan 
& Grace Deason, Social Science Evidence in Law: Psychological Case for Abandoning the “Discriminatory 
Motive” Under Title VII, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1057 (2013) (proposing a safe-harbor approach in the Title VII 
discrimination context). Ultimately, I decided against such a provision because of the difficulty of predicting all 
possible circumstances in advance. A situation might arise where an officer engages in de-escalation measures, 
and yet it is not reasonable for the officer to use deadly force. I would prefer to let the jury in each individual 
case decide whether the officer believed and acted reasonably. 
 245. This was one problem with the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which required a finding that an 
officer’s use of force was unreasonable if the officer’s intentional or reckless conduct provoked that violent 
confrontation and constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Billington v. Smith, 292 F3d 1177, 
1189 (9th Cir. 2002). I believe the question of whether an officer’s use of force was excessive or reasonable 
should be left to the jury’s discretion. 
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measures, the officer’s actions could still be considered reasonable. As one court 
explained, “unreasonable police behavior before a shooting does not necessarily 
make the shooting unconstitutional.”246 That court, however, also wisely noted, 
“[b]ut that does not mean we should refuse to let juries draw reasonable infer-
ences from evidence about events surrounding and leading up to the seizure.”247 
3. Preseizure Conduct 
Third, the proposed model statute allows the fact finder to consider presei-
zure conduct or what some have called “officer-created jeopardy.”248 The term 
“preseizure conduct” is used to refer to conduct by the officer prior to the shoot-
ing that helped create the dangerous situation or increased the likelihood that 
deadly force would need to be used to protect the officer or others. Currently, 
there is a split in the lower courts over whether preseizure conduct of the officer 
can be considered by the jury when assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s 
use of force.  
Many lower courts have held that preseizure conduct by the officer that 
contributed to creating the risk of a deadly confrontation should not be consid-
ered by the jury249 or should be considered only in limited circumstances.250 
                                                                                                                                      
 246. Gardner v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248, 253 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 247. Id. 
 248. For commentary on whether juries should be allowed to consider an officer’s preseizure conduct in 
assessing the reasonableness of his use of force, see Jeffrey J. Noble & Geoffrey P. Alpert, State-Created Dan-
ger: Should Police Officers Be Accountable for Reckless Tactical Decision Making?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN 
POLICING 572–74 (Dunham & Alpert eds. 2015); Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable Peo-
ple: Defining the Totality of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally 
Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 261 (2003); Aaron Kimber, Note, Righteous Shooting, 
Unreasonable Seizure? The Relevance of an Officer’s Pre-Seizure Conduct in an Excessive Force Claim, 13 
WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 651 (2004). 
 249. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits do not allow consideration of preseizure conduct, 
finding such conduct irrelevant to the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force. Terebesi v. Torreso, 
764 F.3d 217, 235 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In cases [where the officer’s prior conduct may have contributed to later 
need to use force], courts in this Circuit and others have discarded evidence of prior negligence or procedural 
violations, focusing instead on ‘the split-second decision to employ deadly force.’”); Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 
86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A]ctions leading up to the shooting are irrelevant to the objective reasonableness of [the 
officer’s] conduct at the moment he decided to employ deadly force.”); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 
1162 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n reviewing the plaintiffs’ excessive force claim, we limit the scope of our inquiry to 
the moments preceding the shooting.”); Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e judge the 
reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew [at the point when the subject 
charged at him]. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether 
the prior police decisions were correct.”); Bella v. Chamberlin, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e 
scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events leading to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment.”) (quoting Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993)); Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 
1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[P]re-seizure conduct is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”); Greenidge v. Ruf-
fin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991) (events which occurred before the seizure “are not relevant and are inad-
missible”). 
 250. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits permit consideration of preseizure conduct under limited circumstances. 
Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing consideration of an officer’s intentional or 
reckless conduct that provokes a violent response in assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s defensive use 
of force only if the officer’s preseizure conduct constitutes an independent constitutional violation); Medina v. 
Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) (limiting consideration of preseizure conduct of the officer to reck-
less or deliberate conduct immediately connected with the use of force); Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 
695, 699 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The reasonableness of [the officers’] actions depends both on whether the officers 
were in danger at the precise moment that they used force and on whether [their] own reckless or deliberate 
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Unfortunately, many of the decisions that disallow consideration of presei-
zure conduct provide little or no explanation of why it makes sense to preclude 
such consideration, simply stating that officers need to make split-second judg-
ments about the amount of force that is necessary in rapidly evolving situations 
and that, therefore, preseizure conduct is irrelevant to the reasonableness of the 
officer’s use of force.251  
In Cole v. Bone, however, the Eighth Circuit attempted to explain why the 
jury’s focus should only be on the seizure itself, not the events leading up to the 
seizure, noting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, 
not unreasonable or ill-advised conduct in general.”252 This attempted explana-
tion, however, merely states a fact—the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreason-
able seizures—but does not explain why the officer’s conduct leading up to the 
moment she uses deadly force is not relevant to the reasonableness of the use of 
deadly force. 
The Seventh Circuit in Plakas v. Drinski attempted another explanation: 
Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period 
is not accidental. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force 
cases. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of 
a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. If the officer 
had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. In this 
sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. But it is trouble which 
the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and 
which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for 
causing. . . . [W]e judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in 
light of all that the officer knew. We do not return to the prior segments of 
the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police 
decisions were correct.253 
While the Seventh Circuit’s explanation is somewhat more fulsome than 
the Eighth Circuit’s, it still does not explain why an officer’s conduct that in-
creased the risk of a deadly confrontation prior to the officer’s use of deadly 
force should not be considered by the fact finder in assessing the overall reason-
ableness of the officer’s actions. 
Other courts do permit consideration of preseizure conduct, recognizing 
that such conduct is relevant to the reasonableness of the officer’s use of force.254 
                                                                                                                                      
conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such force.”). In 2017, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule was [unconstitutional] in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 
1539 (2017). The Eleventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have not yet taken a clear position on whether preseizure 
conduct may be considered in assessing reasonableness in an officer-involved shooting case.  
 251. See, e.g., Salim, 93 F.3d at 92 (holding that the officer’s “actions leading up to the shooting are irrel-
evant to the objective reasonableness of his conduct at the moment he decided to employ deadly force”); Green-
ridge, 927 F.2d at 792 (“[P]olice officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary . . . events which 
occurred before . . . are not probative of the reasonableness of [the officer’s] decision to fire the shot.”). 
 252. 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 253. Plakas, 19 F.3d at 1150. 
 254. The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits permit consideration of preseizure conduct. See, e.g., Young v. 
City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he [trial] court did not abuse its discretion in instructing 
the jury that ‘events leading up to the shooting’ could be considered by it in determining the excessive force 
question.”); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[W]e want to express our disagreement with 
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The fact finder is supposed to consider the totality of the circumstances. What 
the officer did or failed to do before using deadly force is simply part of that 
totality of circumstances.  
There is increasing recognition by police chiefs and others that the deci-
sions leading up to the moment that an officer uses deadly force are relevant to 
whether the officer’s use of deadly force was necessary. As Cathy Lanier, former 
Chief of Police for the District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police Department, 
noted: “The question is not ‘Can you use deadly force?’ The question is, ‘Did 
you absolutely have to use deadly force?’ . . . And the decisions leading up to 
the moment when you fired a shot ultimately determine whether you had to or 
not.”255 
The late John F. Timoney, former First Deputy Commissioner of the New 
York City Police Department, former Commissioner of Police in Philadelphia, 
and former Chief of Police in Miami, echoed these concerns, noting: 
Too often, we only look at the exact moment when an officer uses deadly 
force. We also need to “go upstream” and see whether officers are missing 
opportunities to de-escalate incidents, in order to prevent them from ever 
reaching the point where a use of force is required or justified.256 
While these police chiefs were speaking in the context of training officers 
to engage in de-escalation strategies, as opposed to urging legal reform, their 
comments show an increasing recognition of the important role that preseizure 
conduct plays in the decision to use deadly force. Juries in ordinary self-defense 
cases often consider the defendant’s conduct prior to the confrontation in as-
sessing whether the defendant honestly and reasonably believed deadly force 
was necessary to combat an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.257 
Juries in officer-involved shooting cases should be allowed to consider presei-
zure conduct as well. 
The Supreme Court has not yet explicitly addressed the question of 
whether preseizure conduct of the officer can be considered, but has suggested 
                                                                                                                                      
those courts which have held that analysis of ‘reasonableness’ under the Fourth Amendment requires excluding 
any evidence of events preceding the actual ‘seizure.’”); Gardner v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248, 253 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(suggesting the jury should be permitted to draw “reasonable inferences from evidence about events surrounding 
and leading up to the seizure” while acknowledging that “unreasonable police behavior before a shooting does 
not necessarily make the shooting unconstitutional”); St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 
1995) (“We first reject defendants’ analysis that the police officers’ actions need be examined for “reasonable-
ness” under the Fourth Amendment only at the moment of the shooting. . . . [O]nce it has been established that 
a seizure has occurred, the court should examine the actions of the government officials leading up to the sei-
zure.”). 
 255. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 201, at 16.  
 256. Id. at 47. 
 257. The consideration of preshooting conduct by a civilian defendant claiming self-defense often arises in 
the context of initial-aggressor rules. See, e.g., Freeze v. State, 491 N.E.2d 202, 204–05 (Ind. 1986); Southard 
v. State, 422 N.E.2d 325, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Neale v. State, No. 1406, 2015 Md. App. LEXIS 769, at 
*26–27 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 20, 2015); State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405, 411–12 (Minn. 2006); State v. 
Anthony, 319 S.W.3d 524, 529–30 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Salazar, No. 45050-6-I, 2000 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2541, *10–11 (Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2000). 
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that preseizure conduct should not be considered when assessing whether an of-
ficer’s use of force was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.258 In 2017, 
the Court had the opportunity to weigh in on this question when ruling on the 
constitutionality of the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, but declined to do so, 
leaving the issue open for future consideration.259 
4. Imperfect Self-Defense 
A fourth way the model statute differs from current law is in its importation 
of the concept of imperfect self-defense. In the civilian context, some states have 
recognized the defense of imperfect self-defense, under which a defendant 
charged with murder can be found not guilty of murder but convicted of volun-
tary manslaughter if he honestly but unreasonably believed in the need to act in 
self-defense or used force that was disproportionate to the force threatened and 
thus unreasonable.260 In such cases, the defendant’s claim of self-defense is im-
perfect either because the defendant cannot show that his belief in the need to 
act in self-defense was reasonable, a requirement for a perfect self-defense 
claim, or because he cannot show his use of deadly force was proportionate to 
the force threatened, another requirement of normal self-defense law. Without 
imperfect self-defense, the jury would need to choose between finding the de-
fendant guilty of murder or letting the defendant walk.  
In an officer-involved shooting case where the officer honestly believed he 
needed to use deadly force but his belief was unreasonable, the legally appropri-
ate course of action under current law would be to find the officer guilty of mur-
der because his claim of justifiable force would not be perfect. A jury, however, 
may feel this officer is not as culpable as an officer who intends to kill a suspect 
without any belief in the need to protect human life. Without an imperfect self-
defense doctrine, a jury may acquit the officer who honestly, but unreasonably, 
believed he was acting justifiably rather than find him guilty of murder. An ac-
quittal, however, would be an unsatisfying result to the family and friends of the 
victim. The imperfect self-defense doctrine allows the jury to hold the officer 
accountable for the death he caused yet not label the officer a murderer. 
While some may be dismayed that an imperfect self-defense type of option 
would allow the officer to receive a lighter punishment than if he were convicted 
of murder, the fact is that many officers are currently not even indicted, and 
                                                                                                                                      
 258. San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) (noting that a Fourth Amendment violation 
cannot be established based merely on “bad tactics that result in a deadly confrontation that could have been 
avoided”). 
 259. On March 22, 2017, the Court heard oral argument on whether the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, 
which rendered an otherwise reasonable use of force unreasonable if an officer intentionally or recklessly pro-
voked the violent confrontation through an independent Fourth Amendment violation, comported with the 
Fourth Amendment. County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/county-of-los-angeles-v-mendez/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). On May 30, 2017, the Court held that 
the provocation rule did not comport with the Fourth Amendment. County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. 
Ct. 1539, 1547 (2017) (explicitly declining to address whether the fact finder can take account of any unreason-
able police conduct prior to the use of force).  
 260. See, e.g., In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994). 
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those who are indicted are often found not guilty.261 This may be because when 
faced with an all-or-nothing choice between finding the officer guilty of murder 
or finding the officer not guilty, the jury may feel a not-guilty verdict is the better 
choice.262 
B. Applying the Model Legislation 
In this Part, I will use the Tamir Rice case to show how the model statute 
might be applied to an actual case. 
1. Tamir Rice 
At approximately 3:20 PM on November 22, 2014, an individual in Cleve-
land, Ohio called 911 to report that there was a “guy with a pistol” in the park 
by the West Boulevard Rapid Transit Station, pointing it at people.263 At 3:26 
PM, the 911 dispatcher requested an available unit to respond to a Code 1 at the 
Cudell Recreation Center.264 Officers Frank Garmback and Timothy Loehmann 
advised the dispatcher that they were able to respond.265 The two officers were 
in a fully marked patrol car and both officers were in uniform.266 Officer Garm-
back drove the patrol car, and Officer Loehmann was in the front passenger 
seat.267 The 911 dispatcher told the officers: 
[I]t’s at Cudell Rec Center, 1910 West Boulevard, 1-9-1-0 West Boule-
vard . . . [The caller] said in the park by the youth center there’s a black 
male sitting on a swing. He’s wearing a camouflage hat, a gray jacket with 
black sleeves. He keeps pulling a gun out of his pants and pointing it at 
people.268  
The 911 dispatcher did not tell the officers that the caller had also said the 
gun was “probably fake” and the suspect was “probably a juvenile.”269 
The officers arrived at the scene at approximately 3:30 PM.270 At that time, 
Tamir Rice, a twelve-year-old African American male, was sitting by himself at 
a gazebo.271 According to surveillance video, at 3:30:13 PM, Rice stood up and 
took three or four steps in the direction of the approaching police car.272 His 
hands were out of his pocket and midway between his waist and chest.273 As the 
                                                                                                                                      
 261. Matt Ferner & Nick Wing, Here’s How Many Cops Got Convicted of Murder Last Year for On-Duty 
Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan 13, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-shooting-
convictions_us_5695968ce4b086bc1cd5d0da. 
 262. Id.  
 263. Report by S. Lamar Sims, Esq. to the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney on the officer involved 
shooting of Tamir Rice on November 22, 2014, at 2–5 (Oct. 6, 2015). 
 264. CRAWFORD, supra note 224, at 1. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Sims, supra note 263, at 7. 
 267. Id. at 6. 
 268. Id.  
 269. Id. at 5. 
 270. Id. at 7. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
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patrol car came to a stop near the gazebo, Rice’s hands dropped to his waistband 
area.274 At 3:30:23 PM, Officer Loehmann opened the passenger door of the 
patrol car, firing his gun twice at Rice.275 After Rice fell to the ground, Officer 
Loehmann moved rapidly around the back of the patrol car to a position behind 
the rear of the patrol car on the driver’s side with his weapon drawn and aimed 
in Rice’s direction.276 At about the same time, Officer Garmback got out of the 
patrol car with his weapon drawn and moved around the front of the patrol car 
to a position near the front-right bumper.277 Both officers arrived at their posi-
tions of cover at 3:30:32 PM.278 “The surveillance video shows that the critical 
events took place in less than ten seconds.”279 
The Office of the Prosecuting Attorney for the City of Cleveland, Ohio 
retained two experts to review the case and render an opinion as to whether Of-
ficer Loehmann’s use of deadly force was reasonable or excessive.280 Both ex-
perts evaluated Officer Loehmann’s use of deadly force under the constitutional 
standard, applying Graham v. Connor rather than Ohio’s law regarding the use 
of force in self-defense.281 Both concluded that Officer Loehmann’s use of 
deadly force was reasonable and therefore justified.282 These reports were pre-
sented to a grand jury, which declined to indict Officer Loehmann.283 I review 
                                                                                                                                      
 274. Id. 
 275. Id.; see also TIMOTHY J. MCGINTY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER 
22, 2014 SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR RICE 4, 31 (noting that Officer Loehmann fired at Rice twice, hitting him 
once). 
 276. Sims, supra note 263, at 7.  
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. For a video of the shooting, see Tamir Rice: Police Release Video of 12-year-old’s Fatal Shooting 
– Video, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/nov/ 
26/cleveland-video-tamir-rice-shooting-police. 
 280. See CRAWFORD, supra note 224, at 1; Sims, supra note 263, at 1. 
 281. CRAWFORD, supra note 224, at 2 (“The only constitutional provision at issue when law enforcement 
officers seize[d] an individual by using deadly force is . . . the Fourth Amendment . . . .”); Sims, supra note 263, 
at 10 (“[W]here issues arise regarding the criminality of use of force by police officers, Ohio courts have looked 
to Federal constitutional analysis and principles.”). 
 282. CRAWFORD, supra note 224, at 7 (“[I]t is my conclusion that Officer Loehmann’s use of deadly force 
falls within the realm of reasonableness under the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.”); Sims, supra note 263, 
at 14 (“I conclude that Officer Loehmann’s belief that Rice posed a threat of serious physical harm or death was 
objectively reasonable as was his response to that perceived threat.”). 
 283. Teddy Cahill et al., Calls for Calm After Grand Jury Declines to Indict Officers in Death of Tamir 
Rice, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/12/28/tamir-
rice-grand-jury-announcement-expected-monday/. It is interesting that the prosecutor presented these two re-
ports, which cleared the officers of any wrongdoing, to the grand jury. Ordinarily, the prosecutor leading a grand 
jury proceeding presents evidence that supports an indictment, not evidence that suggests the defendant is inno-
cent. While some states require the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that a prosecutor has no constitutional duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand 
jury. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992). Likewise, in Ohio, there is no law requiring the prose-
cutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. See State v. Ball, 595 N.E.2d 502, 503 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1991) (“R.C. 2939.01, et seq. imposes no statutory duty upon the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to 
the grand jury.”). One appellate court in Ohio, however, has held that “in the interest of justice, if the prosecuting 
party is aware of any substantial evidence negating guilt he should make it known to the grand jury, at least 
where it might reasonably be expected to lead the jury not to indict.” Mayes v. City of Columbus, 664 N.E.2d 
1340, 1348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
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one of these reports below—the report that provides the most detailed explana-
tion supporting the conclusion that Officer Loehmann’s use of deadly force was 
reasonable under U.S. Supreme Court precedents. 
2. Kimberly A. Crawford’s Report 
Crawford, a retired FBI Special Agent previously assigned to the Legal 
Instruction Unit, starts her report by noting that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require a law enforcement officer to be correct, but only requires that he act with 
objective reasonableness.284 She also notes that in Graham v. Connor, the Su-
preme Court specified that the assessment of whether an officer’s use of force is 
reasonable must be viewed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the 
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”285 Crawford emphasizes 
that the relevant facts are only those facts known to the officer at the time the 
officer made the decision to use force.286 Crawford notes that information ac-
quired after the shooting, including the fact that Rice was twelve years old and 
that the weapon in question was an airsoft gun, not a real gun, is not relevant to 
a constitutional review of Officer Loehmann’s actions.287 Likewise, the 911 
caller’s comments to the dispatcher speculating that the individual he was calling 
about might have been a minor and that the weapon in question was probably 
fake should not be considered because this information was not conveyed to the 
officers who responded to the 911 dispatcher’s call for help.288 
a. Threat Identification and Action v. Reaction 
Applying the concepts of threat identification and action v. reaction dis-
cussed above,289 Crawford found that Officer Loehmann’s “response was a rea-
sonable one.”290 Crawford explains: 
When Officers Garmback and Loehmann arrived on the scene, Officer 
Loehmann was on the passenger side of the vehicle which was within close 
proximity to Rice. At the time, Rice was reportedly armed with a handgun, 
and Officer Loehmann was without cover. Following universal training 
and procedures, Officer Loehmann’s attention would be focused on Rice’s 
hands as they moved towards his waist band and lifted his jacket. Unques-
tionably, the actions of Rice could reasonably be perceived as a serious 
threat to Officer Loehmann. Waiting to see if Rice came out with a firearm 
would be contrary to action versus reaction training. Considering Officer 
Loehmann’s close proximity to Rice and lack of cover, the need to react 
quickly was imperative. Delaying the use of force until Officer Loehmann 
                                                                                                                                      
 284. CRAWFORD, supra note 224, at 2 (“It is significant that the Fourth Amendment does not require a law 
enforcement officer to be right when conducting a seizure. Rather, the standard is one of objective reasonable-
ness.”) (emphasis in original). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 224–29. 
 290. CRAWFORD, supra note 224, at 4. 
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could confirm Rice’s intentions would not be considered a safe alternative 
under the circumstances.291 
b. Age 
Crawford also discusses the fact that Tamir Rice was only twelve years old 
at the time of the shooting. Crawford notes that both officers said they thought 
Rice was in his late teens or early twenties.292 Empirical research suggests a 
common tendency by both civilians and police officers to overestimate the age 
of Black youths.293 Crawford opines that whether Rice looked his age or not is 
irrelevant in the assessment of the reasonableness of Officer Loehmann’s use of 
force.294 She explains that “[a] twelve-year-old with a gun, unquestionably old 
enough to pull a trigger, poses a threat equal to that of a full-grown adult in a 
similar situation.”295 Crawford then discusses the use of interactive video sce-
narios to train FBI agents on the Department of Justice’s use-of-deadly-force 
policy.296 One of these scenarios requires the agent to confront a mildly handi-
capped fifteen-year-old with a gun.297 Most agents focused on the individual’s 
behavior, rather than his apparent disability or age.298 The few agents who did 
take note of the subject’s age or disability, and consequently hesitated to use 
deadly force, were not able to react in a timely manner when the subject quickly 
raised the gun and fired several shots.299 The point of this training scenario, 
Crawford notes, was to illustrate that a firearm in the hands of any person capa-
ble of pulling the trigger can pose a serious threat regardless of the holder’s 
physical or mental development.300 
c. Toy Gun  
Crawford also addresses the fact that Rice was in possession of an airsoft 
gun, not a real handgun, in her report.301 Crawford explains that this after-ac-
quired fact is not relevant to whether the officer’s decision to use deadly force 
was reasonable in the moment since the officer did not have any information to 
suggest that the weapon was anything but a real handgun.302 Apparently, at some 
point before the day in question, the gun, which belonged to Rice’s friend, had 
been broken and was fixed by the friend’s father, but the father was unable to 
                                                                                                                                      
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Goff et al., supra note 46, at 532, 535. Most of the photos of Tamir Rice in the news media depict a 
thin, youthful looking boy. At the time he was shot, Rice was 5 foot 7 inches tall and approximately 200 pounds. 
Sims, supra note 263, at 9.  
 294. CRAWFORD, supra note 224, at 4–5. 
 295. Id. at 5. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
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get the orange safety tip back on the end of the muzzle.303 Therefore, the gun 
that Rice had in his possession the day he was shot did not have the orange safety 
tip that would have indicated to officers that it was a toy gun. At least one wit-
ness (other than the person who called 911) thought the gun was a real gun until 
Rice showed her the little green plastic balls that he was using as ammunition.304 
Special Agent Crawford’s report is extremely persuasive. It is true that 
when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force, only the facts 
known to the officer or the facts that the officer should have known at the time 
are relevant. It is not fair to consider facts acquired after the incident. It is also 
true that officers are trained to recognize threats that the ordinary civilian might 
not recognize.305 It is true that it takes time to recognize a threatening action, 
calculate possible responses to that threat, and then act.306 Under current Su-
preme Court law on when the use of force is unreasonable or excessive and thus 
unconstitutional, Crawford’s analysis is largely correct. 
Under my model statute, however, a jury could reach a different conclu-
sion. Recall that under my model statute, the jury would be permitted to consider 
any preseizure conduct by the officer or officers involved that increased the risk 
of a deadly confrontation in assessing whether their actions were reasonable. In 
this case, the video surveillance shows that Officer Garmback drove right up to 
the gazebo where Rice was sitting, putting Officer Loehmann in a very danger-
ous position.307 Officer Loehmann exited the car, even though by doing so, he 
put himself in a very vulnerable position without cover and increased the risk 
that deadly force would be necessary to protect his safety.308 The jury would also 
be permitted to consider whether the officers could have but did not engage in 
any de-escalation measures. Here, one might argue that Officer Garmback could 
have stopped the patrol car further away so both officers could have gotten out 
of the patrol car and taken cover before engaging with Rice. If Officer Garmback 
had stopped the patrol car further away from Rice, the officers could have tried 
to talk with Rice instead of immediately firing upon him. They could have asked 
or told him to drop the gun and walk away from it with his hands above his 
head.309 In this case, while it appeared that Rice had a real gun, the officers never 
ordered him to drop it.  
A prosecutor could argue that a reasonable officer would have known, and 
Officer Garmback should have known, that driving the patrol car within a few 
feet of an individual with a gun would leave his partner vulnerable and without 
                                                                                                                                      
 303. Sims, supra note 263, at 2. 
 304. Id. at 4. 
 305. Lee, Race, Policing and Lethal Force, supra note 18, at 169 (noting that studies have found police 
officers are better than ordinary civilians at recognizing whether or not an individual has a gun).  
 306. See Blair et al., supra note 214, at 336. 
 307. See Sims, supra note 263, at 13 (noting that the police car driven by Officer Garmback stopped within 
just ten feet of Rice). 
 308. Id. at 12.  
 309. One might object that this sounds like a lot of Monday-morning quarterbacking, which is precisely 
what the Graham v. Connor court warned was not appropriate. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
Juries, however, are tasked with looking at the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether those circum-
stances support a finding that the officer’s use of force was reasonable, and it is the job of the attorneys to explain 
to the jury which facts are or are not relevant.  
LEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018  10:35 AM 
680 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
cover. Both officers knew, or should have known, that it would be wise to take 
cover, then try to talk with Rice and encourage him to drop the gun, but they did 
not take these actions prior to the fatal shooting.310 If they had, perhaps they 
would have realized from his voice that Rice was not an adult. In light of the 
objective facts, a jury could conclude that the officers’ actions were not reason-
able even though it may have been reasonable at the moment Officer Loehmann 
shot Rice for him to believe it was necessary to do so to protect himself from a 
threat of death.311 
Not mentioned in either Crawford’s nor Sims’s report, but found in Cuya-
hoga County Prosecutor Timothy J. McGinty’s report on the November 22, 2014 
shooting death of Tamir Rice, is the fact that it had recently snowed and the 
ground was wet and covered with wet leaves and snow.312 McGinty noted, “Due 
to the conditions, the police car slid about 40 feet and stopped right in front of 
the gazebo. Simultaneously with the car sliding, Tamir took a couple of steps 
northwest toward the open field, and then approached the sliding police car.”313 
This additional information changes the equation, suggesting Officer Garmback 
should not be faulted for putting his partner in a vulnerable and dangerous situ-
ation if he did not intentionally drive the patrol car right up to the gazebo. A jury 
with this additional information about the wet, slippery road conditions de-
scribed in Prosecutor McGinty’s report could decide that the officers believed 
and acted reasonably. 
Under my model statute, it would be up to the jury to decide whether, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the officer or officers in question believed and 
acted reasonably. It is appropriate in cases involving contested facts for a jury to 
decide such matters. In some cases, we may not like what the jury decides, but 
it is the jury’s prerogative, as the conscience of the community, to make these 
difficult decisions. 
Another piece of information that Crawford did not address in her report 
was the fact that, prior to joining the Cleveland Police Department, Officer 
Loehmann “had resigned from another department after being found unfit for 
duty and recommended for dismissal.”314 Apparently the Deputy Chief from the 
Independence, Ohio Police Department felt Loehmann was so unfit to be a po-
lice officer that he wrote, “I do not believe time, nor training, will be able to 
                                                                                                                                      
 310. Officer Loehmann shot Rice within seconds of exiting the patrol car. Sims, supra note 263, at 7. 
 311. Under my proposal, if the officers were charged with murder, the jury could return a verdict of not 
guilty of murder, but guilty of voluntary manslaughter if the officers’ beliefs were reasonable but their actions 
were unreasonable. 
 312. TIMOTHY J. MCGINTY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER 22, 2014 
SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR RICE 4.  
 313. Id. 
 314. James Downie, Lessons of Tamir Rice’s Death, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2016, 8:50 AM), http://www. 
chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-tamir-rice-police-shootings-20160104-story.html; see also 
Roger Goldman, Importance of State Law in Police Reform, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363, 372 (2016). Roger Gold-
man points to the “need for a way to track law enforcement officers who have engaged in serious misconduct so 
that a department will not unknowingly hire an unfit officer.” Id. at 383. He notes that “there is a databank, the 
National Decertification Index (NDI), which is administered by the International Association of Directors of 
Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST)” and that “[t]he executive directors of all the state POSTs 
may query the NDI” and “authorize law enforcement agencies in their states to access the NDI.” Id. 
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change or correct these deficiencies.”315 Four other police departments rejected 
Officer Loehmann before the Cleveland Police Department hired him.316 On 
May 30, 2017, the Cleveland Police Department fired Officer Loehmann for ly-
ing on his application.317 
C. Possible Objections 
My model statute will likely be resisted for a number of reasons. Below, I 
outline some of the expected objections to my proposal and my responses to 
those objections. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 315. Goldman, supra note 3, at 372. Approximately four months after the Independence Police Department 
hired Officer Timothy Loehmann, Deputy Chief Jim Polak wrote a memorandum to the Human Resources Di-
rector, recommending Loehmann’s dismissal. Memorandum from Deputy Chief Jim Polak on Patrolman Loeh-
mann to Human Resources Director Lubin 4 (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.documentcloud.org/docu-
ments/1374235-independence-timothy-loehmann-response-to.html#document/p56. Deputy Chief Polak based 
his recommendation for dismissal on four incidents that occurred during Loehmann’s short period of employ-
ment, stating that they demonstrated “a pattern of a lack of maturity, indiscretion and not following instructions.” 
Id. at 2. The first incident occurred during firearms qualification training, where Loehmann was “distracted and 
weepy,” and “could not follow simple directions, could not communicate clear thoughts nor recollections, and 
his handgun performance was dismal.” Id. at 1. Loehmann suffered an “emotional meltdown” and was sent home 
early because he was unable to continue with the training. Id. Loehmann also stated that he did not have any 
friends and had cried over his girlfriend “every day for four months.” Id. The second incident occurred when 
Loehmann was issued his firearm and was told that it needed to be secured in his locker while he was not 
working. Id. at 2. When asked if he had a lock, Loehmann replied that he did. The next day, however, Sergeant 
Tinnirello noticed that Loehmann’s locker did not have a lock on it. Id. When Tinnirello asked Loehmann why 
there was not a lock on his locker, Loehmann replied that he did have a lock, but did not have time to put it on 
the locker because he left it at home, and therefore left his firearm unsecured in his locker overnight. Id. The 
third incident occurred when Sergeant Tinnirello told Loehmann to sit in the dispatch center as part of his ori-
entation. Id. Shortly after giving these instructions, Tinnirello found Loehmann in the patrol room, and when he 
asked him why he was not in the dispatch center, Loehmann replied that the dispatchers told him he was done 
and to go upstairs. Id. Loehmann later confessed to Tinnirello that he had lied—the dispatchers never told him 
to go upstairs; he went on his own. Id. The final incident took place when Sergeant Tinnirello issued Loehmann 
his bulletproof vest and told him to wear it in order to get used to it. Id. About a half hour later, Tinnirello found 
Loehmann with the vest off, and when questioned, Loehmann stated that he took it off because he was “too 
warm.” Id. Deputy Chief Polak recommended Loehmann for dismissal in light of these occurrences, stating that 
Loehmann displayed a “dangerous lack of composure during live range training,” and an inability to manage 
personal stress. Id. at 4. Before Loehmann could be dismissed from his position, he resigned from the Independ-
ence Police Department, citing “personal reasons” as the cause for his resignation. Letter from Timothy Loeh-
mann to Jim Polak, Deputy Chief, Independence Police Department (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.document-
cloud.org/documents/1374235-independence-timothy-loehmann-response-to.html#document/p7. 
 316. Downie, supra note 314; see also Goldman, supra note 3, at 382 (proposing that every state enact a 
“comprehensive law that takes away the ability of unfit officers to continue in law enforcement”). 
 317. Lindsey Bever & Wesley Lowery, Cleveland Police Officer Who Fatally Shot 12-Year-Old Tamir 
Rice Is Fired–But Not for the Killing, WASH. POST (May 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/05/30/cleveland-police-officer-who-fatally-shot-12-year-old-tamir-rice-is-fired 
/?utm_term=.fcb228c66805 (“[Loehmann] concealed key details about his near-firing from another local police 
department and his failed attempts to be hired at several other departments before applying to work for the 
Cleveland police.”); Adam Ferrise, Cleveland Officer Timothy Loehmann Fired in Wake of Tamir Rice Shooting, 
CLEVELAND.COM (May 30, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/05/cleveland_officer_timo-
thy_loeh_1.html; Jason Hanna & Amanda Watts, Tamir Rice Shooting Probe: 1 Officer Fired, 1 Suspended, 
CNN (May 30, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/30/us/cleveland-tamir-rice-police-officers-disciplined/ 
(noting that Loehmann failed to mention on his application form that he would have been fired if he had not 
resigned from the Independence Police Department and did not disclose that he had failed a written exam while 
applying for a job with the police department in Maple Heights). 
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1. The Model Legislation Encourages Jurors to Second-Guess Police 
Officers with the Advantage of Hindsight 
One objection that might be lodged against my proposal is that, by explic-
itly directing jurors to consider whether the officer engaged in de-escalation 
measures, including the use of less deadly alternatives, prior to using deadly 
force, the model legislation encourages jurors to engage in Monday-morning 
quarterbacking, or second-guessing, of police officers. My response to this ob-
jection is that jurors in all cases involving claims of self-defense or defense of 
others, which is the essence of a police officer’s claim of justifiable force, en-
gage in an after-the-fact assessment of the facts. 
To mitigate the possibility of unfair second-guessing, my model statute, 
like current law, has the jury assess the reasonableness of the officer’s use of 
deadly force from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the defendant of-
ficer’s shoes. This means that only the facts and circumstances known to the 
officer at the time are relevant. Information acquired afterwards is not relevant 
if the defendant officer did not know, or have reason to know of, such infor-
mation at the time. 
2. States Should Be Free to Adopt Their Own Rules 
Another objection to my proposal might be called a federalism objection. 
One concerned about federal restrictions on states’ rights might argue that states 
should be free to adopt their own rules regarding when a law enforcement of-
ficer’s use of deadly force is justified. Each state is primarily responsible for the 
health, safety, and welfare of its residents. A state may have special concerns 
that support a different set of rules than the rules that are adopted in another 
state. 
This objection is misplaced. My proposal does not prohibit states from 
adopting their own laws regarding the use of deadly force by law enforcement 
officers. My proposal is not a federal statute that would govern in all states. My 
model statute is offered simply as a model for states to follow if they so choose. 
As a matter of policy, I think my model statute is better than existing state stat-
utes on police use of force, and I would support federal legislation based on my 
model statute, but since I am proposing a model statute, not a federal statute, 
states would remain free to adopt or reject my model statute. 
3. As a Model Statute, the Proposed Reform Has No Teeth. 
A third objection that might be lodged against my proposal is that, as a 
model statute, it would have no teeth. Indeed, one might ask, what incentive 
would state legislators have to pass legislation that might be viewed as making 
it more difficult for police officers to do their jobs? A vote for such legislation 
might be perceived as being “soft on crime.”  
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I admit that given the current political climate, the chances of state legisla-
tures adopting my model legislation are fairly slim. Nonetheless, many Ameri-
cans are troubled by the spate of police shootings that have largely impacted 
Black individuals.318 The time has come for state legislators to step up to the 
plate and do what they can to try to reduce the loss of life that occurs when police 
use deadly force in cases where they could have taken steps to avoid the loss of 
life. Legislators can address this pressing problem by enacting my model stat-
ute.319 
4. The Model Legislation Is Too Complicated for the Average Juror to 
Understand. 
A fourth objection that might be lodged against my proposed model legis-
lation is that it is too complicated for the average juror to follow. Jury instruc-
tions need to be short and simple. One opposed to my model statute might argue 
that it complicates the inquiry into whether an officer’s use of deadly force was 
justified and makes it more difficult for jurors to do their job. 
While I agree that short and simple is usually the best policy when it comes 
to jury instructions, I do not think my model legislation makes it too difficult for 
the average juror to assess whether a police officer was justified in the use of 
deadly force when a person has been killed. By listing just three factors that the 
jury should consider, my model legislation provides more guidance than current 
use-of-force statutes, which simply tell jurors to assess whether the officer’s be-
lief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable. By disaggregating beliefs 
from actions, and requiring jurors to find that the officer’s beliefs and actions 
were both reasonable, my model legislation makes explicit the normative inquiry 
that is merely implicit in most current statutes. The officer’s actions must have 
been proportionate, necessary, and appropriate under the circumstances. Rather 
than complicating matters, the model statute brings clarity to the table. 
The problem with current police use-of-force statutes is that they provide 
no guidance to jurors with regard to when an officer’s use of force is or is not 
reasonable, simply leaving it up to jurors to decide this difficult question on their 
own. The model legislation provides jurors with much-needed guidance, using 
clear and simple language that the average layperson can understand. 
5. Police Officers Need Bright-Line Rules. 
A related objection is the argument that police officers need clear, bright-
line rules to guide their decisions in the field, especially in tense, rapidly evolv-
ing situations involving suspects who are threatening the officer or others with 
                                                                                                                                      
 318. Mazzone & Rushin, supra note 3, at 266–67 (“Today, across the political spectrum is deep and wide-
spread concern about abusive police practices and their impact upon racial minorities.”). 
 319. Passing such legislation might be difficult, however, because of resistance from powerful police un-
ions. See Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (2016); L. Song Richardson & Catherine 
Fisk, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712 (2017); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE 
L.J. 1191 (2017). 
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death or serious bodily injury.320 The Supreme Court itself has recognized that 
“[i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal 
doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.”321 As the 
Court has noted: 
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and 
buts, and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, 
may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and 
judges regularly feed, but they may be “literally impossible of application 
by the officer in the field.”322 
My response to this objection is that current law does not provide police 
officers with a clear, bright-line rule. Most use-of-force statutes utilize a reason-
ableness standard that is open-ended and subject to interpretation. By providing 
a list of factors that can inform the reasonableness inquiry, my model statute 
provides officers with more guidance than current use-of-force statutes. I 
acknowledge that my model statute does not provide bright-line rules for either 
police officers or jurors, but this is because I believe it important that the jury 
retain discretion to consider the facts and circumstances and render a verdict 
without being directed to find either for or against the officer. 
6. Preseizure Conduct Should Not Be Considered. 
Another possible objection to my proposal is the argument that juries 
should not be allowed to consider preseizure conduct. As noted above, the term 
“preseizure conduct” is used to refer to conduct by the officer prior to the shoot-
ing that helped create the dangerous situation or increased the likelihood that 
deadly force would need to be used to protect the officer or others. As mentioned 
above, whether the jury should be allowed to consider preseizure conduct is an 
issue that has split the courts.323 
My response to this objection is that, as long as reasonableness is the stand-
ard used to assess whether an officer’s use of force was justified, it makes sense 
to permit the jury to consider preseizure conduct as part of the totality of the 
circumstances. Reasonableness standards are purposely open-ended to allow 
consideration of all the facts and circumstances. Whether the officer engaged in 
conduct prior to the shooting that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation is 
relevant to whether the officer acted reasonably. As one court explained: 
[W]e do not see how these cases [that preclude consideration of preseizure 
conduct] can reconcile the Supreme Court’s rule requiring examination of 
the “totality of the circumstances” with a rigid rule that excludes all con-
text and causes prior to the moment the seizure is finally accomplished. 
                                                                                                                                      
 320. A recent national survey of 450 law enforcement leaders across the country found that when it came 
to external regulation of law enforcement, simplicity and safety were two of their top most important concerns. 
Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Constitutional Policing and Compromise (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author).   
 321. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001)). 
 322. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudi-
cation” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142).  
 323. See supra notes 249–54. 
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“Totality” is an encompassing word. It implies that reasonableness should 
be sensitive to all of the factors bearing on the officer’s use of force.324 
It is important to remember that even if an officer acted negligently or vi-
olated police procedures, and thereby increased the risk of a deadly confronta-
tion, this would not preclude a jury from finding that the officer’s use of force 
was reasonable. For example, in Greenidge v. Ruffin, a female police officer in 
plain clothes observed a man and a woman engaging in an act of prostitution in 
a car.325 With her police badge hanging from her neck, the officer opened the car 
door with one hand, identified herself as an officer, and ordered the two passen-
gers to place their hands in plain view.326 When neither complied, the officer 
pointed her revolver into the vehicle and repeated her order.327 When the male 
passenger reached for a long cylindrical object behind the seat, the officer 
thought he was reaching for a shotgun and fired her weapon at him, striking him 
in the jaw and causing permanent injury.328 The long cylindrical object he was 
reaching for turned out to be a wooden nightstick.329 
The man brought suit against the officer, alleging that the use of deadly 
force during the arrest for prostitution was unreasonable and in violation of his 
constitutional rights.330 At trial, the court excluded evidence of the officer’s al-
leged violation of standard police procedure for nighttime prostitution arrests, 
which, if followed, would have entailed employing proper backup and using a 
flashlight. 331 The plaintiff alleged that the officer’s preseizure conduct in viola-
tion of police procedure recklessly created a dangerous situation.332 The Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence of the officer’s 
preseizure conduct, finding it irrelevant and thus inadmissible.333 The court ex-
plained, “[W]e are persuaded that events which occurred before Officer Ruffin 
opened the car door . . . are not probative of the reasonableness of Ruffin’s de-
cision to fire the shot.”334 
Under my model statute, the trial court would have to allow the jury to 
consider the officer’s alleged violation of police procedure in assessing the rea-
sonableness of her use of deadly force. Such consideration would not likely 
change the outcome. The fact that the officer failed to use a flashlight or employ 
backup did not make her decision to use deadly force unreasonable when both 
passengers refused to comply with her order to show their hands and the male 
passenger started reaching for a long, cylindrical object behind him that could 
have been a shotgun or rifle. 
                                                                                                                                      
 324. Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 325. Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 791. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at 792. 
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One might wonder why courts should allow juries to consider this kind of 
preseizure conduct if such consideration would be unlikely to alter the verdict? 
One should permit the jury to consider preseizure conduct even though it might 
not make a difference in this case because it might make a difference in another 
case. As a general matter, giving the jury more, rather than less, information will 
help them make better decisions. 
There are a few additional reasons why it makes sense to permit juries to 
consider preseizure conduct. First, juries in ordinary self-defense cases involv-
ing the deployment of deadly force are permitted to consider events preceding 
the use of deadly force, including anything the defendant did that might have 
created the dangerous situation or increased the likelihood of a deadly confron-
tation.335 For example, during the 2013 murder trial of George Zimmerman, the 
Neighborhood Watch person who shot and killed Trayvon Martin, an African 
American teenager, the prosecution was allowed to bring up the fact that Zim-
merman, the defendant in that case, ignored a 911 dispatcher’s suggestion that 
he stay in his car and wait for police.336 If juries in ordinary self-defense cases 
are allowed to consider the preseizure conduct of civilian-defendants that in-
creased the likelihood of a violent confrontation, juries in officer-involved 
shooting cases should also be allowed to consider the preseizure conduct of the 
officer-defendant that increased the likelihood of a violent confrontation. 
Second, jurors in officer-involved shooting cases are allowed to consider 
the preseizure conduct of the victim-suspect in assessing the reasonableness of 
the officer’s use of force.337 If jurors can consider the preseizure conduct of the 
victim, they should be allowed to consider the preseizure conduct of the officer-
defendant as well. It is not fair to allow consideration of the victim’s preseizure 
conduct and disallow consideration of the officer-defendant’s preseizure con-
duct. 
7. The Model Statute Goes Beyond What Is Required of Ordinary Civilians 
Claiming Self-Defense. 
Another possible objection is that my model statute goes beyond what is 
required of ordinary civilians in self-defense cases. Current self-defense law fo-
cuses on the reasonableness of the civilian’s belief in the need to act in self-
                                                                                                                                      
 335. See supra note 257. 
 336. The recording of the 911 call was played to the jury at Zimmerman’s trial. See Axiom Amnesia, Sean 
Noffke (911 Operator) Testimony 6/24/2013 - Trayvon Martin George Zimmerman Trial, YOUTUBE (June 26, 
2013), https://youtu.be/aorB-sT8Co0. For excellent analysis of why Zimmerman was acquitted, see Alafair 
Burke, What You May Not Know About the Zimmerman Verdict: The Evolution of the Jury Instruction, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alafair-burke/george-zimmerman-jury-in-
structions_b_3596685.html; see also Lee, Denying the Significance of Race, supra note 108, at 31–37 (examin-
ing the reasons why the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorneys in the Zimmerman case treated the case as if it 
had nothing to do with race); Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin, supra note 108, at 101 (providing a critical race 
critique of the Zimmerman trial, more commonly known as the Trayvon Martin case); Lee, Making Race Salient, 
supra note 14, at 1602.  
 337. Thomson v. Salt Lake Cty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1313 (10th Cir. 2009); Phillips v. James, 422 F.3d 1075, 
1081 (10th Cir. 2005); Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1281 (11th Cir. 2002); Pethtel v. W. Va. State Police, 
568 F. Supp. 2d 658, 667 (N.D.W. Va. 2008).  
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defense and does not separately require an inquiry into the reasonableness of the 
civilian’s actions.  
I have three responses to this objection. First, unlike ordinary civilians, 
police officers are entrusted with the power to use force against the citizenry for 
the citizenry’s protection. When an officer allegedly abuses that power, that of-
ficer should be held to a higher standard than ordinary civilians.  
Second, even though self-defense doctrine in most states explicitly focuses 
on whether the individual reasonably believed in the need to use force, whether 
the individual’s actions were reasonable is an implied requirement. In order to 
be found not guilty on self-defense grounds, one who uses deadly force in self-
defense must have reasonably believed it was necessary to use deadly force to 
protect against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. In other 
words, one’s use of force must have been necessary as well as proportionate. I 
have elsewhere proposed that self-defense doctrine explicitly require a finding 
that one’s actions as well as one’s beliefs were reasonable.338 Here, I am propos-
ing the same explicitness in the police use-of-deadly-force context.  
Third, my model statute simply encourages the fact finder to engage in the 
same kinds of inquiries that jurors in self-defense cases consider. In assessing 
necessity, jurors in ordinary self-defense cases often consider whether there 
were less deadly alternatives available to the defendant. In assessing proportion-
ality, jurors in ordinary self-defense cases involving the use of deadly force often 
consider whether the victim posed a threat of death or serious bodily injury. In 
deciding questions regarding whether the defendant was the initial aggressor, 
jurors in ordinary self-defense cases often consider the preseizure conduct of the 
defendant. The questions that my model statute encourages jurors to ask in of-
ficer-involved shooting cases are similar to the questions jurors in ordinary self-
defense cases usually consider. 
8. Why Not a Civil Remedy? 
Some might object to my proposal on the ground that a civil remedy would 
be a much better way to effectuate police reform than model legislation on police 
use of force. As noted by my colleague Mary Cheh over twenty years ago, a civil 
remedy would provide the victim or his or her estate a number of advantages 
over criminal prosecution: 
First, a victim of police misconduct can sue on his or her own behalf and 
need not await the government’s decision to go forward. Second, an in-
jured party need not overcome the heightened procedural protections af-
forded the criminally accused. For example, a plaintiff can prevail under a 
preponderance of evidence standard rather than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Third, . . . the civil law provides compensation to victims who have 
been harmed by police misconduct. Recompense is beneficial in itself, and 
damage awards can spur reform if the costs of misbehavior are big.339 
                                                                                                                                      
 338. See LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 95, at 269–73; Lee, The Act-Belief Dis-
tinction in Self-Defense Doctrine, supra note 211, at 221–38 (1998). 
 339. Cheh, supra note 24, at 248. 
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I considered adding language to my model statute that would grant victims 
of unjustified police use of deadly force a civil remedy, but decided against do-
ing so because my area of expertise is criminal, not civil, law. As noted at the 
beginning of this Article, I believe reform of policing practices must be multi-
faceted. I am not opposed to civil remedies, but I leave the drafting of such pro-
posals to others who have more expertise on such matters. 
9. The Proposed Reform Would Provoke Civil Unrest 
Another objection to my proposed reform is that by making it easier to 
convict police officers who assert a use of force defense, the reform would in-
crease the number of criminal prosecutions of police officers but not necessarily 
result in more convictions, leading to more civil unrest. Police officers by and 
large would still be found not guilty because judges and juries would still favor 
police officers regardless of changes to the law.340 The more police officers are 
prosecuted but not convicted, the more angry certain segments of the population 
(those concerned about police misconduct, those concerned about police over-
reach, those concerned about police killings of Black and Brown individuals, 
etc.) will become. The widespread unrest in St. Louis, Missouri following the 
not guilty verdict in September 2017 in the case of James Stockley, a White 
former police officer, charged with murder in the 2011 shooting of Anthony La-
mar Smith, a twenty-four-year-old Black man, provides an example of how a 
not guilty verdict seen as unjust by the community can result in widespread pro-
tests that can turn violent.341 Rather than help bridge relations between police 
and the community, criminal prosecutions of police officers that end in acquit-
tals can exacerbate existing tensions between the community and the police.342 
I agree that my proposed reform has the potential to provoke civil unrest, 
which would not be a good thing. One of the biggest impediments to successful 
reform is the distrust that currently exists between certain communities and the 
police. It is critically important that we build trust between community members 
and the police and between police and the communities they serve. Adopting my 
                                                                                                                                      
 340. See supra notes 6–7. 
 341. Jim Salter & Summer Ballentine, 9 Arrested in St. Louis During Protests After Officer’s Acquittal, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2017, at A4; Mark Berman & Wesley Lowery, Ex-St. Louis Officer Found Not Guilty of 
Murder, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2017, at A3; Mark Berman, St. Louis Remains on Edge, Days After Acquittal, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2017, at A2. 
 342. In the Stockley case, prosecutors thought they had a fairly strong case for conviction since Officer 
Stockley was recorded during a high-speed chase of Smith, saying he was going to kill Smith. Berman & Low-
ery, supra note 341. Stockley then approached Smith’s vehicle and fired five times into the car, hitting Smith 
five times and killing him. Id. Stockley claimed he shot Smith in self-defense, but prosecutors argued that Stock-
ley planted the gun found in Smith’s car, noting that the only DNA found on the gun belonged the Stockley. 
Berman, St. Louis Remains on Edge, Days After Acquittal, supra note 341. Stockley waived his right to a jury 
trial, and was found not guilty by Judge Timothy Wilson who said he agonized over the evidence, but was 
“simply not firmly convinced” of Stockley’s guilt. Id. The Stockley case suggests a problem with the allocation 
of the burden of proof in self-defense cases in general and police claims of justifiable force in particular. Most 
states place the burden of disproving a defendant’s claim of self-defense on the prosecution rather than placing 
the burden of proving self-defense on the defendant. Self-defense, however, is generally considered to be an 
affirmative defense, not a case-in-chief defense, so the legislature may allocate the burden of proof to either 
party. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
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proposed legislation would go a long way towards encouraging such trust, espe-
cially if such legislation brings about significant reductions in officer-involved 
shootings of unarmed individuals. 
Ultimately, successful police reform requires a shift in cultural norms both 
within police departments and within society. The law can help promote change 
in cultural attitudes, but it is only one vehicle for such change. 
10. Officer Lives Will Be Endangered if Officers Hesitate to Act out of Fear of 
Prosecution.  
A final possible objection to my proposal is that by toughening up the legal 
standard, even slightly, my model statute will result in more prosecutions and, 
in turn, more convictions of police officers who use deadly force on the job.343 
Knowing that they might face criminal prosecution and possible incarceration 
may discourage police officers from using deadly force in situations when they 
should use deadly force, endangering officers and leading to more officer 
deaths.344 This, in turn, will lead to fewer individuals being willing to become 
police officers, exacerbating a problem already facing many departments—a 
shortage of good officers.345 
J. Michael McGuinness, for example, argues that the “increasing criminal-
ization of American policing is among the most dangerous legal developments 
in law enforcement jurisprudence in recent decades.”346 McGuinness, however, 
fails to recognize that there has actually been very little reform of state use-of-
force statutes. Nonetheless, this is perhaps the hardest objection to counter be-
cause it is true that a change to the legal standard will likely have an impact “on 
the ground” in terms of what officers do.347 As Rachel Harmon acknowledges, 
“officers prohibited from defending themselves might well become less effec-
tive in serving the State if they suffer more injuries when attacked or become 
hesitant in carrying out their mission.”348 Similarly, Larry Rosenthal noted that 
“a regime that simply exposes officers to an enhanced risk of sanctions when 
they intervene in the streetscape likely biases officers toward inaction.”349 
Rosenthal argues that making it easier to impose criminal or civil liability on 
                                                                                                                                      
 343. See McGuinness, supra note 3, at 26–27. 
 344. See id. at 33.  
 345. Harmon, supra note 13, at 1156 (noting the significant shortage of qualified applicants for law en-
forcement positions in the United States and the fact that “screening, selection and training costs make replacing 
an officer an expensive proposition”). 
 346. McGuiness, supra note 3, at 27.  
 347. Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards hypothesize that given the uptick in property crimes in jurisdic-
tions with DOJ consent decrees, police officers may pull back and not act as proactively as they might otherwise 
in response to federal intervention. Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 
758–59 (2017).  
 348. Harmon, supra note 13, at 1156–57. 
 349. Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to Address Police Violence, 48 URB. L. 675, 718 (2016). 
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police officers is likely to result in overdeterrence or depolicing, i.e. less aggres-
sive enforcement of the criminal laws, which he suggests may lead potential 
criminal offenders to commit more crimes.350 
It is important to recognize that officers put their lives on the line for all of 
us and sometimes need to make split-second decisions,351 relying on the infor-
mation available to them at the time—decisions that may end up being just plain 
wrong when the person they thought was armed turns out to be unarmed—which 
is why my model statute, like current law, does not require that the officer be 
correct in his or her assessment of the threat and allows the jury to assess the 
reasonableness of an officer’s beliefs and actions from the perspective of a rea-
sonable officer in the defendant’s shoes. 
It is also important to recognize that current law has proven inadequate to 
discourage the use of deadly force in many situations where it appears such force 
was not appropriate. The modest change in the legal standard that my model 
statute proposes would play an important role in shaping police culture by en-
couraging officers to engage in the types of conduct that many police chiefs and 
others recognize would help reduce the incidents of bad police shootings.352 If 
adopted, my model statute would perform the dual function of encouraging of-
ficers to engage in de-escalation strategies while helping to insulate from crim-
inal liability those officers who do engage in de-escalation measures. My model 
statute would also provide useful guidance to the jury by specifying the factors 
it must consider in assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s beliefs and ac-
tions. 
If officers started engaging more frequently in de-escalation strategies, this 
would buttress police legitimacy in the public eye. Increased legitimacy would 
go a long way toward establishing public trust in police, which would help police 
officers do their jobs. Rather than overdeter, my model statute should encourage 
officers in dangerous situations, where the instinct to self-preserve is strongest, 
to be more careful before using deadly force. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our nation’s police officers are entrusted with power and authority that the 
average civilian does not possess. When an officer uses that power to shoot an 
individual, that officer’s decision to use deadly force should be carefully evalu-
                                                                                                                                      
 350. Id. at 718–19. See also Frank Rudy Cooper, Understanding ‘Depolicing’: Symbiosis Theory and Crit-
ical Cultural Theory, 71 UMKC L. REV. 335 (2002-2003) (critiquing the practice of depolicing).  
 351. Seth Stoughton, a former police officer, argued that deference to police officers based on the need to 
make split-second decisions is not warranted in most cases since most use of force incidents are “typified by 
tactical preparation, a degree of premeditation, low levels of resistance, low levels of force, and a low probability 
of injury . . . .” Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 868 (2014). 
 352. In terms of shaping police culture, a statute enacted by a democratically elected legislature might bear 
more legitimacy to certain groups, including police officers, than decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
some see as an elite group of individuals legislating from the bench on subjects about which they know very 
little. I thank Christopher Paul, a student in my Criminal Procedure class during the spring of 2017, for this 
suggestion. 
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ated to ensure that it was the appropriate choice of action under the circum-
stances. “The use of force, including deadly force, is at once necessary to 
achieve law enforcement goals and contrary to the core mission to protect 
life.”353 Making sure the law allows police officers to use deadly force only when 
such force is necessary and proportionate is critically important, especially today 
when public confidence in police is at a historic low. My model statute responds 
to the need to restore public trust in police in communities where that trust has 
eroded. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 353. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT AND MINIMIZING USE OF 
FORCE 1 (Ederheimer ed. April 2007). 
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